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EMBRACING INSECURITY: HARM 
REDUCTION THROUGH A NO-FAULT 
APPROACH TO CONSUMER DATA  
BREACH LITIGATION 
Abstract: The lack of a clear remedy for data subjects whose private information 
has been compromised in data breaches prompts expensive and exploratory liti-
gation that encounters difficulties with the unique set of risks posed by the data 
economy. Examining the market forces and risk environments posed by the data 
economy yields the conclusion that vulnerability is a guaranteed feature and in-
vestments in cybersecurity go largely unrewarded. The importance of data to our 
economy requires that the benefit of potential solutions to data subjects be 
weighed against the potential costs of burdening innovation. This Note proposes 
that the ideal solution should prioritize harm reduction by implementing a no-
fault resolution system to provide an efficient remedy for compromised data sub-
jects and a safe harbor-based compliance program to improve cybersecurity 
without hampering the direction of innovation. 
INTRODUCTION: OUR BEAST OF BURDEN 
If you have ever owned a credit card or had a credit score, your personal 
data is likely to have been compromised in one or more recent data breaches.1 A 
deluge of litigation typically follows in the wake of high profile data breaches as 
compromised individuals, or “data subjects,” seek satisfaction under various tort, 
contract, and statutory causes of action, generally alleging that the breached 
entity failed to take sufficient precautions to prevent the breach.2 The lack of 
comprehensive federal regulation on the use of consumer data has led to a le-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Seena Gressin, The Equifax Data Breach: What to Do, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Sept. 8, 
2017), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2017/09/equifax-data-breach-what-do [https://perma.cc/
9FPC-UJ6T] (stating that the Equifax breach alone has compromised the data of essentially every 
American with a credit report). 
 2 See Melissa Maleske, The 6 Lawsuits All GCs Face After a Data Breach, LAW360 (Dec. 9, 
2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/735838 [https://perma.cc/L7K9-ABNV] (reviewing the typi-
cal set of lawsuits that companies face in the aftermath of a data breach from consumers, financial 
institutions, insurers, shareholders, employees, and government entities); see, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Memo-
randum in Support of Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement at 2–6, In re Anthem, Inc. 
Data Breach Litig., No. 15-MD-02617-LHK, 2017 WL 3699869 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2017) (chroni-
cling the consolidated litigation comprising over one hundred filed suits and several hundred claims 
arising out of the laws of all fifty states and the ensuing settlement negotiations). Data subjects are the 
people whose personal data is collected and used by various entities and comprise consumers, em-
ployees, and business clients who must submit to this data collection for functional or commercial 
purposes. See 5 C.F.R. § 293.102 (2020) (defining the term data subject as the individual about whom 
records are being kept for Office of Personnel Management purposes). 
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gal vacuum that has been slowly pressurized over years of litigation, enforce-
ment actions, and state regulations, but is still rife with uncertainty.3 The 
search for a workable set of legal standards has been stymied by the complexi-
ty of technology and the difficulties inherent in data security—to date, no data 
breach consumer class action suit has made it to trial and litigation of these 
issues would pose significant challenges.4 Further complicating a resolution is 
the recognition that the extension of liability has the potential to shape the di-
rection of innovation and cause shocks to the economy.5 
The modern economy is heavily dependent on the use of consumer data, 
but this carries a pervasive risk of identity theft to all data subjects.6 The 
amount of leaked personally identifiable information (PII) has increased year-
over-year and over eleven thousand breaches have been reported since 2005 
comprising over 1.6 billion records.7 Industry professionals are often hyperbol-
                                                                                                                           
 3 See Shawn Marie Boyne, Data Protection in the United States, 66 AM. J. COMP. L. 299, 302–
04, 332–33 (2018) (discussing how the sectoral approach and lack of overarching federal legislation 
regarding data protection and privacy has created a “latticework of narrowly tailored laws” and reme-
dies). 
 4 See id. (discussing the varied remedies prescribed by the relevant statutes for each industry). See 
generally 1 E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW § 2.01, Westlaw (database updated Jan. 2020) (provid-
ing a background on the development of legal standards to govern data breaches and the significant 
uncertainty that remains). 
 5 See, e.g., Longenecker-Wells v. BeneCard Servs., Inc., No. 1:15-CV-00422, 2015 WL 5576753, 
at *6 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2015) aff’d, 658 Fed. App’x 659 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he threat of data 
breaches by unknown third parties is omnipresent[;] . . . the potential disparity between the degree of a 
defendant’s fault and the damages to be recovered could be immensely disproportionate, resulting in 
drastic implications for defendants . . . as well as our economic system at large.”); Brief of the Cham-
ber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at 21–25, Attias v. 
CareFirst, Inc., 863 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (No. 16-7108) (representing business interests as an 
amicus and arguing that granting standing to plaintiffs who have not yet suffered harm will be costly 
and burdensome to American businesses); see also Thomas J. Kneisner & John D. Leeth, Regulating 
Occupational and Product Risks, in HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 
493, 494, 503 (Mark J. Machina & W. Kip Viscusi eds., 2014) (discussing the effects of liability and 
policy on innovation); Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringe-
ment Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1346–50, 1381–83 (2004) (exploring 
how litigation and legislation assigning liability in novel cyberlaw cases can suppress or shift the 
direction of innovation, including the “loss of the p2p dissemination network”). 
 6 See N.Y. CYBER TASK FORCE, COLUMBIA SCH. OF INT’L & PUB. AFFAIRS, BUILDING A DEFEN-
SIBLE CYBERSPACE: REPORT OF THE NEW YORK CYBER TASK FORCE 6–9 (2017) (discussing the 
risks inherent to widespread usage and rapid development of internet technologies); Paul E. Black, A 
Software Assurance Reference Dataset: Thousands of Programs with Known Bugs, 123 J. RES. NAT’L 
INST. STANDARDS & TECH., 2018, at 1, 1–3 (describing the Software Assurance Reference Dataset, a 
collection of over one-hundred seventy thousand known software bugs, and explaining how code of 
typical industry quality tends to contain readily identifiable bugs that are sometimes basic weaknesses 
made more complicated by the specific code complexities implemented); Data Is Giving Rise to a 
New Economy, THE ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2017/05/06/
data-is-giving-rise-to-a-new-economy [https://perma.cc/T4F3-M5GJ] (emphasizing the importance of 
data to our economy). 
 7 See Data Breaches, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., https://www.idtheftcenter.org/data-
breaches/ [https://perma.cc/VE83-K52Z] (compiling reported breach figures since 2005); ITRC Multi-
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ic in their characterizations of how difficult data security is and how consum-
ers should regard data breach as an inevitability.8 Additionally, organizations 
are incentivized to invest as little as they can get away with in cybersecurity as 
the return on these proactive investments tends to be low and damage control 
is often cheaper and likely to be incurred anyway.9 
Data breaches create substantial costs for both the compromised individu-
als who face the risk of identity theft as well as breached organizations who 
must answer to angry data subjects, shareholders, regulators, or other stake-
holders.10 Much of the harm to data subjects comes in the form of poorly un-
derstood increased future risks, complicating projections of what actual costs 
flow from a data breach and who bears them.11 The uncertain regulatory land-
                                                                                                                           
Year Data Breach Chart Jan. 1, 2005–Dec. 31, 2018, IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., https://www.
idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Multi-Year-Chart.pdf [https://perma.cc/9F6S-4R3X] 
(graphing the increase from 157 reported breaches in 2005 to over one thousand reported breaches in 
each of the past three years). Privacy Rights Clearinghouse tallies a drastically higher number: over 
eleven billion records breached since 2005. Data Breaches, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, 
https://www.privacyrights.org/data-breaches [https://perma.cc/GZ8J-PRGE]. Generally, personally 
identifiable information (PII) is that which could be used to identify a particular data subject. See 
Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address at the Technology Policy Insti-
tute Aspen Forum: Protecting Consumer Privacy in the Digital Age, 3–4 (Aug. 22, 2016), https://
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/980623/ramirez_-_protecting_consumer_
privacy_n_digital_age_aspen_8-22-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/XMG9-P6H7]. As data collection be-
comes more sophisticated, some at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have advocated for an ex-
pansion of the traditional categories of PII to include other more abstract types of data such as static 
Internet Protocol addresses that can be used to track down data subjects despite lacking clear identifi-
ers. See id. (discussing how sophisticated analyses of meta-data have expanded the usefulness and 
ability to attribute data that lacks personal identifiers). 
 8 See, e.g., BRUCE SCHNEIER, CLICK HERE TO KILL EVERYBODY 19 (2018) (“The only truly 
secure system is one that is powered off, cast in a block of concrete, and sealed in a lead-lined room 
with armed guards—and even then I have my doubts.”) (quoting expert Gene Spafford); see also N.Y. 
CYBER TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 6–9 (discussing the architectural and human reasons why cyber-
security struggles to keep up with attackers). 
 9 See Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Strengthening Cybersecurity with Cyberinsurance Markets 
and Better Risk Assessment, 102 MINN. L. REV. 191, 220–22 (2017) (explaining how the risks and 
incentives for internet-connected products sometimes favor cheap design over security); Jun Zhuang 
et al., Subsidies in Interdependent Security with Heterogeneous Discount Rates, 52 ENGINEERING 
ECONOMIST 1, 16–18 (2007) (modeling a dominant strategy of low investment in security when there 
are high investment costs and factors that diminish the return on investment); Bruce Schneier, Liabil-
ity Changes Everything, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Nov. 2003), https://www.schneier.com/essays/
archives/2003/11/liability_changes_ev.html [https://perma.cc/A4JQ-XY42] (describing the costs of 
cybersecurity compared to damage control and how it produces a rational financial decision to invest 
as little as possible into cybersecurity). 
 10 See PONEMON INST., 2018 COST OF A DATA BREACH STUDY: GLOBAL OVERVIEW 15 (2018) 
(finding that data breaches cost American companies an average of $7.91 million); Maleske, supra 
note 2 (describing the six classes of stakeholders who are likely to be plaintiffs in data breach litiga-
tion). 
 11 See PAUL DREYER ET AL., RAND CORP., ESTIMATING THE GLOBAL COST OF CYBER RISK 1 
(2018) (explaining that the costs created by exfiltration of PII are difficult to model due to complex sec-
ond-order costs); IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., IDENTITY THEFT: THE AFTERMATH 2017, at 7 
(2018) [hereinafter THE AFTERMATH 2017] (listing a variety of negative effects of identity theft); Attor-
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scape and lack of a clear consumer remedy create an inefficient response to 
this ubiquitous threat by prompting complex litigation actions and unclear 
compliance obligations that substantially add to overall costs.12 
This Note argues that a no-fault scheme including a centralized consumer 
remedy and a safe harbor-based regulatory program with clear compliance 
standards would reduce the costs that flow from the inevitable breaches with-
out stifling innovation.13 Part I of this Note provides an overview of the costs 
created by data breaches and the scope of data breach litigation.14 Part II pre-
sents some of the market characteristics that have frustrated the development 
of robust data security practices and discusses the difficulty of regulating in-
ternet technologies due to the possible chilling effects on innovation.15 Part III 
argues that a limited harm reduction framework can better account for the im-
portance of data to our economy, the inevitability of data insecurity, and the 
difficulty of creating legal and technical standards than traditional approaches 
to private liability.16 Additionally, the safe harbor incentive and clearer compli-
ance costs will more effectively encourage sustainable security practices than 
the current uncertain standards that reward reactive damage control rather than 
proactive investment into security.17 
                                                                                                                           
ney General William P. Barr Announces Indictment of Four Members of China’s Military for Hacking 
into Equifax, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-
william-p-barr-announces-indictment-four-members-china-s-military [https://perma.cc/MJ3W-2778] 
(detailing the potentially wide ranging harms that may flow from the Equifax breach, which has now 
been attributed to the Chinese military). 
 12 See PONEMON INST., supra note 10, at 28 (reporting that data breaches cost American organi-
zations an average of $1.76 million in post-breach response expenses including litigation and regulato-
ry intervention costs). 
 13 See infra notes 134–200 and accompanying text (discussing the market failures and environ-
ment of risks that are stifling the development of legal standards and the excess costs they create); 
infra notes 201–272 and accompanying text (analyzing the greater efficiency of a no-fault approach). 
 14 See infra notes 18–133 and accompanying text (providing background information on the costs 
that data breaches cause to both data subjects and organizations and on data breach litigation). 
 15 See infra notes 134–200 and accompanying text (discussing the issues preventing effective 
cybersecurity and the implications that imposing new standards may have on innovation). 
 16 See infra notes 201–272 and accompanying text (analyzing the issue and proposing a solution). 
See generally LabMD, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 894 F.3d 1221, 1236–37 (11th Cir. 2018) (discuss-
ing the difficulty of developing reasonable security standards); Stephen Shavell, Liability for Harm 
Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 358–64 (1984) (discussing the determinants of 
when government intervention may benefit the social welfare). 
 17 See Mark. A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. 
L. 101, 110–13, 119 (2007) (analyzing several safe harbor regimes and concluding, despite any imper-
fections, that “[i]nternet intermediaries need safe harbors”); see also infra notes 239–272 and accom-
panying text (explaining the merits of this approach within this context). 
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I. YOU CAN’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT: A CRASH  
COURSE IN DATA BREACH LITIGATION 
The impact of data integration on our modern economy has been likened 
to the effect of oil on the industrial revolution.18 Data augments and improves 
existing operations and gives rise to an entire industry of data services and in-
formation technology enterprise solutions.19 The growing usage of data has 
also created a thriving black market for this information and large datasets are 
now profitable targets for cybercriminals.20 
This Part will provide a brief overview of data breaches, the costs they 
create, and the types of litigation and enforcement actions that tend to follow 
them.21 Section A explores the costs that flow from data breaches to data sub-
jects and breached entities.22 Section B provides a summary of the varied liti-
gation and enforcement actions that data breaches prompt.23 
A. The Cost of Data Breach 
Data breaches create substantial costs that are borne by data subjects, the 
breached entity, and other third-parties.24 Data breaches comprise several types 
of incidents that result in the exposure of data, including: malicious cyberat-
tacks, attacks targeting human employees, and even inadvertent errors.25 The 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See Data Is Giving Rise to a New Economy, supra note 6 (analogizing the effect of data as a 
driver of growth to the effect of oil on the industrial revolution). Taking it a step further, The Econo-
mist has even suggested data has supplanted oil as the world’s most valuable resource. See The 
World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, but Data, THE ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017), https://
www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data 
[https://perma.cc/4KV5-7EP4] (discussing the value of data to the modern economy). 
 19 See BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR DATA 
AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 51–53 (2015) (discussing the feedback loop created by the usage of 
data that has influenced the growth of the data broker industry, which in turn affects marketing and 
strategy in many other industries). 
 20 See JAMES ANDREW LEWIS, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF 
CYBERCRIME: NO SLOWING DOWN 2–6 (2018) (linking the growth of cybercrime to growing internet 
usage and new ways to monetize this personal information). 
 21 See infra notes 24–126 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 24–63 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 64–126 and accompanying text. 
 24 See N. ERIC WEISS & RENA S. MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43496, THE TARGET AND 
OTHER FINANCIAL DATA BREACHES: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 14–19 (2015) (listing the 
costs of payment card data breaches unique to each of the various stakeholders); DREYER ET AL., 
supra note 11, at 4–9 (modeling the costs of cyber risk); PONEMON INST., supra note 10, at 3 (listing 
findings on the average total cost of a data breach). Various sources attempt to put an average mone-
tary value on each record compromised, but the wealth of variables involved in each case limits the 
cost-predictive use of these without more specific knowledge of what data an entity possesses. See, 
e.g., PONEMON INST., supra note 10, at 7–8 (detailing various factors found to affect the cost of a 
given data breach). 
 25 See PONEMON INST., supra note 10, at 8 (identifying the three main classes of data breach as 
malicious attacks, computer glitches, and human error). 
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internet has grown exponentially, but also incrementally, yielding a system 
comprised of a patchwork of proprietary software, networks, and protocols 
layered tenuously on top of one another.26 The same architecture that makes it 
so accessible to innovators and users also makes security a virtual impossibil-
ity and leaves us with a tangled network of known and unknown vulnerabili-
ties as well as a pervasive threat of data breach.27 The complexity of technolo-
gy also makes the average user highly vulnerable to phishing and social engi-
neering.28 
The disclosure by Marriott International that the data of up to 383 million 
people had been compromised adds to the list of highly publicized mega-leaks 
that have afflicted companies like Yahoo (500 million sensitive records) or 
Equifax (143 million Social Security Numbers (SSNs)).29 Several ignominious 
                                                                                                                           
 26 See N.Y. CYBER TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 4, 7 (explaining how software is designed for 
accessibility and compatibility with many other programs and devices and how this lack of uniformity 
undermines cybersecurity); SCHNEIER, supra note 19, at 140–43 (discussing the complexity of our 
computer systems). 
 27 See N.Y. CYBER TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 4–9 (discussing the inherent challenges of se-
curing complex and varied networks); SCHNEIER, supra note 19, at 141 (“Complexity is the worst 
enemy of security, and our systems are getting more complex all the time.”); Black, supra note 6, at 
1–4 (detailing the SARD dataset of over 170,000 known software bugs). This complexity creates 
vulnerabilities, but also greatly complicates forensic analysis and challenges experts who seek to un-
derstand how a given breach occurred. See MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T 
REFORM, 115TH CONG., REP. ON THE EQUIFAX DATA BREACH 54 (2018) (detailing the testimony of 
the forensic analysts investigating the Equifax breach and the difficulty they encountered due to the 
“very complex” technology infrastructure in place with multiple outdated legacy systems adapted to 
function alongside newer systems). Additionally, cybersecurity improvements can sometimes backfire 
and increase vulnerability by introducing further complexity to computer systems. See Josephine 
Wolff, Perverse Effects in Defense of Computer Systems: When More Is Less, 33 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 
597, 599 (2016) (discussing how unforeseen interactions between security measures and system com-
ponents can give rise to unexpected vulnerabilities). 
 28 See IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., PHISHING AND TAX FRAUD: UNDERSTANDING THESE GROW-
ING CRIMES’ EFFECTS ON BUSINESSES 1–2 (2017) (discussing the sophistication and effectiveness of 
human-targeted cybercrimes that seek to exploit the lack of knowledge of lay employees of business-
es). 
 29 See Nicole Perlroth, All 3 Billion Yahoo Accounts Were Affected by 2013 Attack, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/technology/yahoo-hack-3-billion-users.html 
[https://perma.cc/824C-BASU] (reporting on the scope of the Yahoo breaches); 2017 Cybersecurity 
Incident, EQUIFAX, https://www.equifaxsecurity2017.com/ [https://perma.cc/PF4A-XWV5] (provid-
ing information about the Equifax leak and affected consumers); Marriott Provides Update on Star-
wood Database Security Incident, MARRIOTT INT’L: NEWS CTR, (Jan. 4, 2019), https://news.marriott.
com/2019/01/marriott-provides-update-on-starwood-database-security-incident/ [https://perma.cc/
RDW7-QTQU] (providing the updated results of internal investigations into the scope of the breach); 
see also S.C. DEP’T OF REVENUE, PUBLIC INCIDENT RESPONSE REPORT 2–4 (2012) (detailing the 
findings of the investigation into the hack of South Carolina taxpayer data); What Happened, OFFICE 
OF PERS. MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/ [https://perma.cc/
D34S-GQT4] (providing information about the Office of Personnel Management breaches that com-
promised over 21.5 million Social Security Numbers). The Marriott breach has been attributed to 
Marriott’s acquisition of the Starwood brand of hotels and the continuous exploitation of a vulnerabil-
ity in the Starwood reservation system apparently dating back to 2014. Marriott Provides Update on 
2020] No-Fault Approach to Consumer Data Breach Litigation 1229 
websites track the daily disclosure of breaches in both the public and private 
sector.30 One organization tallied that over 446 million records containing sen-
sitive PII were compromised in 2018.31 
1. Data Subject Harms: Identity Theft and Elevated Lifetime Risk 
In 2014, the Bureau of Justice Statistics estimated that 7% of all U.S. res-
idents age sixteen or older had been victimized by identity theft over the prior 
year, with this number rising to 10% in 2016.32 Fraudulent charges are the 
most concrete identity theft harm, but a number of more abstract harms have 
been noted as well.33 In many cases, the charges are reimbursed by some in-
termediary and estimates vary on how often victims are forced to bear these 
costs.34 One 2016 report estimated that only 12% of victims faced out of pock-
et losses, but a recent survey found that almost 40% of respondents were in 
                                                                                                                           
Starwood Database Security Incident, supra (discussing how the acquisition of Starwood and its vul-
nerable systems led to the Marriott data breach despite Marriott’s cybersecurity efforts). 
 30 See, e.g., MASS. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION REPORT 2018, at 
1–90 (2019) (providing Massachusetts data breach disclosures); Breach Portal, OFFICE FOR CIVIL 
RIGHTS, https://ocrportal.hhs.gov/ocr/breach/breach_report.jsf [https://perma.cc/683W-QQPJ] (show-
ing the Health and Human Services HIPAA violation breach page); Data Breach Notifications, 
WASH. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., http://www.atg.wa.gov/data-breach-notifications [https://
www.atg.wa.gov/data-breach-notifications] (providing Washington data breach disclosures); Search 
Data Security Breaches, CAL. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/databreach/list 
[https://perma.cc/7KF9-KVU7] (providing California data breach disclosures); see also IDENTITY 
THEFT RES. CTR., 2018 END-OF-YEAR DATA BREACH REPORT 7 (2019) (reporting that over 2,300 
government agencies across thirty-five states were impacted by the breaches of two third-party pay-
ment platforms); News Sections, DATABREACHES, https://www.databreaches.net/ [https://perma.
cc/MU9L-YFBM] (providing an updated-daily-tracker of breaches large and small). 
 31 See IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., supra note 30, at 9 (tallying numbers from reported breaches). 
The report contains a disclaimer that these figures are only based on what is reported and notes that 
many breaches are likely as-yet undetected or unreported. Id. Only half of the 1,244 reported breaches 
also reported the number of records compromised and the 446 million records represent only those 
that reported those figures. Id. 
 32 ERIKA HARRELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, VICTIMS OF IDENTITY THEFT, 2016, at 2 
(2019) [hereinafter HARRELL, VICTIMS OF IDENTITY THEFT, 2016]; ERIKA HARRELL, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, VICTIMS OF IDENTITY THEFT, 2014, at 2 (rev. 2017) [hereinafter HARRELL, VIC-
TIMS OF IDENTITY THEFT, 2014]. 
 33 See IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., THE AFTERMATH: THE NON-ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF IDENTI-
TY THEFT 2018, at 1, 3–4, 7–8 (2018) [hereinafter THE AFTERMATH 2018] (finding that victims of 
identity theft report negative impacts spanning mental, physical, and interpersonal issues); THE AF-
TERMATH 2017, supra note 11, at 7–12 (finding many negative financial impacts caused by fraudulent 
charges as well as negative emotional and physical impacts). 
 34 See 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (2018) (limiting consumer liability for fraudulent charges if card issuers 
provide proper notification channels); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688, 696–97 (7th 
Cir. 2015) (discussing scenarios where certain reimbursement policies may be foreclosed by delays in 
reporting fraudulent charges); 12 C.F.R. § 205.6 (2020) (limiting consumer liability for fraudulent 
charges if the charges are reported in a timely fashion). 
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debt or struggling to pay their bills after identity theft.35 Another survey 
showed considerable consumer dissatisfaction with how resolution processes 
are handled, reporting satisfaction levels under 50% for what are sometimes 
protracted dealings with financial institutions, credit agencies, law enforce-
ment, and federal regulators.36 
The harm of identity theft also relates to what data is stolen—consumers 
who have different information stolen face different risks and over different 
time periods.37 Stolen credit card information is a short term risk to consumers 
because the cards are easily canceled and the damage is generally limited to 
the fraudulent charges that a thief can incur before being detected.38 SSNs are 
not as easily replaced and, when leaked, can create a potential lifetime of vul-
nerabilities.39 In 2017, almost 158 million SSNs were exposed across 1,579 
tracked breaches.40 The Equifax breach alone exposed a reported 145.5 million 
SSNs.41 
There are additional identity theft harms that are harder to quantify, such 
as the increased risk of future fraudulent activity and the varied emotional 
harms of compromised privacy.42 There also may be new harms that material-
                                                                                                                           
 35 See HARRELL, VICTIMS OF IDENTITY THEFT, 2016, supra note 32, at 9 (finding that 12% of 
victims faced out of pocket costs); IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., supra note 11, at 8 (finding that 
almost 40% of respondents experienced financial difficulties of some kind). Over 30% of consumers 
reported that they borrowed money or took out loans as a result of their identity theft and 15% sold 
property to pay expenses. IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CTR., supra note 11, at 8. Mitigating the harm 
of an incident often requires consumers to take time off work or away from family, close accounts, or 
even move residences. Id. 
 36 See THE AFTERMATH 2018, supra note 33, at 5 (reporting satisfaction levels under 50% for 
consumer dealings with credit issuers and financial services, credit reporting agencies, law enforce-
ment, and the FTC); see also THE AFTERMATH 2017, supra note 11, at 13 (finding that over 60% of 
respondents had yet to resolve their identity theft issues and that 10% of them had spent from one to 
five years attempting to do so). 
 37 See HARRELL, VICTIMS OF IDENTITY THEFT, 2016, supra note 32, at 9, 11 (showing that the 
type of identity theft has an impact on the time required to resolve and both the financial and emotion-
al harms reported). 
 38 See IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., 2017 ANNUAL DATA BREACH YEAR-END REVIEW 5 (2018) 
(labeling SSN’s as the most valuable piece of data to thieves); Stan Horaczek, Your Social Security 
Number Probably Got Leaked and That’s Very, Very Bad, POPULAR SCI. (May 10, 2018), https://
www.popsci.com/social-security-number-equifax-leak [https://perma.cc/K7TS-K7ER] (remarking on 
the lesser threat that credit card information theft poses compared to social security number theft). 
 39 See Horaczek, supra note 38 (reporting on the long-term threat of leaked Social Security Num-
bers and the difficult, long, and expensive process to get a new one). Stolen Social Security numbers 
empower bad actors to open lines of credit, new accounts, and file false tax returns among other nefar-
ious acts. See id. 
 40 IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., supra note 38, at 5. 
 41 See MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 115TH CONG., REP. ON 
THE EQUIFAX DATA BREACH 53 (2018).  
 42 See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 692–93 (reasoning that the heightened risk of future injury sufficed 
for standing even before actual injury occurred, and asking, “Why else would hackers . . . steal con-
sumers’ private information?”); IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., supra note 11, at 7 (listing a variety of 
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ize in the future.43 Experts had been puzzled over the seeming lack of tradi-
tional criminal activity associated with the Equifax data and suspected this 
might indicate more nefarious uses, including blackmail of potential intelli-
gence assets and other statecraft.44 The Department of Justice’s recent issuance 
of indictments against four Chinese military hackers, alleging their responsibil-
ity for the Equifax hack at the direction of the Chinese intelligence services, 
indicates that the threat posed by this massive theft of data could be equally 
massive in scope.45 
2. Organizational Harms 
Data breaches cause organizations to experience a mix of quantifiable 
harms, like breach response and litigation costs, as well as harder to quantify 
harms like reputational damage.46 In 2018, the average total cost of a data 
breach to an American organization was estimated at $7.91 million or $233 per 
record.47 Data breaches include both inadvertent mistakes that leave data ex-
posed to potential misuse as well as the costlier malicious cyberattacks, where 
                                                                                                                           
negative effects of identity theft); IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., supra note 33, at 3, 5 (noting that vic-
tims experience a variety of life impacts and emotional disruptions). 
 43 See SCHNEIER, supra note 8, at 50–51 (describing the “identity theft of the future” as “scary” in 
part because we cannot yet predict what authentication and identification issues may emerge); see also 
PATRICK O’REILLY ET AL., NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., 2017 ANNUAL REPORT: NIST/ITL 
CYBERSECURITY PROGRAM 1 (2018) (noting that advances in quantum computing could result in 
widespread vulnerability by rendering current encryption standards obsolete). Schneier poses a terrify-
ing hypothetical: data-based assassinations. SCHNEIER, supra note 8, at 79. He worries about a future 
in which hackers can modify medical data to set a target up to receive a transfusion with the wrong 
blood type or a medicine that they are allergic to, as well as other similarly dystopian uses. See id. 
 44 See Kate Fazzini, Equifax Mystery: Where Is the Data?, CNBC (Feb. 13, 2019), https://
www.cnbc.com/2019/02/13/equifax-mystery-where-is-the-data.html [https://perma.cc/FDG4-FBMC] 
(reporting on the concerns of security experts, who had not been able to locate the Equifax data for 
sale on the dark web for use in typical identity theft schemes in the immediate aftermath of the 
breach). 
 45 See Attorney General William P. Barr Announces Indictment of Four Members of China’s 
Military for Hacking into Equifax, supra note 11 (announcing the results of a two year investigation 
into the source of the Equifax breach and the ensuing indictment of four hackers associated with the 
Chinese military). Attorney General Barr’s remarks reflected a high degree of confidence in the at-
tribution of this breach to these hackers. See id. He commented that although issuing indictments 
against the members of foreign militaries is irregular, the seriousness of the breach and the potential 
scope of the harm to both American consumers and businesses “cannot be countenanced.” Id. 
 46 See PONEMON INST., supra note 10, at 30 (comparing the “direct and indirect costs” that follow 
data breaches and how they differ across countries and industries). Stringently regulated industries, 
such as financial services and healthcare, face higher average costs, likely a result of the types and 
amounts of data those industries tend to collect and the increased regulatory burden following a 
breach. See id. at 18 (finding higher costs in the healthcare and financial services industries).  
 47 Id. at 9. The United States led all countries in both average total cost as well as average per 
capita costs, per record compromised. Id. 
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data is targeted by bad actors and exfiltrated.48 The risk posed by a potential 
data breach prompts substantial investment into cybersecurity in order to miti-
gate these costs or avoid them altogether.49 
The moment an organization discovers a breach, the clock starts on a 
handful of regulatory requirements that all require careful navigation.50 Imme-
diately following the breach, many organizations conduct investigations, en-
gage forensic and communications firms, and implement damage control tech-
niques that are designed to limit some of the long term costs.51 Breach incident 
response firms are often brought in, at considerable expense, to oversee the 
investigation and notification process in order to minimize exposure to liability 
as a result of the breach.52 Loss of productivity often results as efforts are 
shifted organizationally to address the breach.53 In the longer term, organiza-
tions suffer reputational harms, loss of goodwill, and customer loss that vary 
by industry and the availability of alternatives.54 
Organizations face significant costs from data breach litigation due to the 
volume and complexity of the suits likely to be filed.55 Simply projecting the 
                                                                                                                           
 48 See id. (finding that most breaches are caused by targeted attacks and that these attacks cost 
organizations more per compromised record than other types of data breach). In some cases, inadvert-
ent exposures are discovered internally and rectified before they are discovered by bad actors, which 
may account for why these categories yielded lower average costs per capita. See id. at 8–9. 
 49 See COUNCIL OF INS. AGENTS & BROKERS, CYBER INSURANCE MARKET WATCH SURVEY: 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, FEBRUARY 2019, at 2–3 (2019) (finding that 33% of respondents had pur-
chased some type of cyber insurance for the first time in the past year, a figure consistent with previ-
ous years); Guarav Pendse, Cybersecurity: Industry Report & Investment Case, NASDAQ (June 25, 
2018), https://business.nasdaq.com/marketinsite/2018/GIS/Cybersecurity-Industry-Report-Investment-
Case.html [https://perma.cc/Q2JZ-6B9X] (discussing how the increasing number of cyber-incidents 
are contributing to the expansion of the cybersecurity industry). 
 50 PONEMON INST., supra note 10, at 22 (comparing the effect of twenty-two different prepared-
ness and incident response techniques on the average costs of data breach); see, e.g., Commission 
Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosures, Exchange Act Release No. 
10,459, 118 SEC Docket 3993 (Feb. 21, 2018), 2018 WL 993646, at *7–13 (providing guidance on 
cybersecurity disclosure obligations for public companies that experience incidents). 
 51 See DREYER ET AL., supra note 11, at 1 (finding that immediate mitigation costs account for 
10% of total breach costs and less immediate mitigation costs account for another 8% of the total); 
PONEMON INST., supra note 10, at 22 (finding that retention of an incident response team produces the 
greatest cost savings of all twenty-two preparedness and response factors). 
 52 See PONEMON INST., supra note 10, at 22 (showing that retaining a breach response firm pro-
duces a positive return on investment by reducing the costs of the breach). 
 53 See IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., supra note 28, at 1 (noting that the resolution of phishing at-
tacks was found to cost an average of over $1.8 million in lost productivity); PONEMON INST., 2017 
COST OF CYBER CRIME STUDY 29 (2017) (finding that business disruptions, including lower employ-
ee productivity, accounted for almost one-third of the cost consequences of a cybercrime). 
 54 See DREYER ET AL., supra note 11, at 1 (finding reputational losses made up 8% of costs in an 
aggregated data set of breaches); PONEMON INST., supra note 10, at 29 (finding that American organi-
zations face higher costs due to customer churn and loss of goodwill than other countries). 
 55 See Maleske, supra note 2 (discussing the various data breach litigation actions that breached 
organizations are likely to face); see, e.g., In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. 
Supp. 3d 1154, 1172–76 (D. Minn. 2014) (analyzing complex issues of class representation, state 
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various regulatory stakeholders and potential plaintiffs is a difficult task and 
requires knowledge of what data was taken and the technical aspects of the 
intrusion.56 Settlements with compromised data subjects generally include 
provisions establishing reimbursement funds and credit monitoring services.57 
Shareholder derivative suits allege breaches of fiduciary duty or inadequate 
public risk disclosures.58 Regulators may seek fines and stakeholders are likely 
to seek enhanced disclosure obligations and future audits as part of probation-
ary compliance plans.59 
                                                                                                                           
causes of action, and state common laws in a consolidated set of thirty-three actions originally filed in 
eighteen districts); Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Approval of Class Action Set-
tlement, supra note 2, at 1–6 (detailing the scale of the two-year litigation that included over two hun-
dred depositions, fourteen discovery motions, and 3.8 million pages of documents despite being lim-
ited as a streamlined bellwether trial testing only certain claims). 
 56 See, e.g., Second Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities 
Law at 2, 4–8, In re Yahoo! Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 17-CV-00373-LHK, 2018 WL 4283377 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 7, 2018) (alleging that a class of shareholders of Yahoo stock were harmed by failures to safe-
guard data and then properly disclose the breach); Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Sept. 29, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/WS7N-NJTY] (listing state 
breach notification statutes); see also Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Per-
sonal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data 
Protection Regulation), art. 33, 2016 O.J. (L 119/1) (creating breach disclosure obligations for entities 
in possession of PII of residents of the European Union); Martin F. Grace, Economics of State Versus 
Federal Regulation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW 321, 328–29 
(2015) (explaining the extra costs inherent to compliance with multiple regulatory schemes).  
 57 See, e.g., In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., 327 F.R.D. 299, 318 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2018) 
(discussing the $115 million settlement, including $15 million set aside as a general out-of-pocket-
cost reimbursement fund and two years of credit monitoring for affected individuals); Home Depot 
Breach Settlement, KCC CLASS ACTION SERVS. LLC, http://www.homedepotbreachsettlement.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/CFM8-QZ3A] (providing a claim form entitling class members to reimbursement 
from the $13 million settlement fund and free credit monitoring for eighteen months under settlement 
terms). 
 58 See Maleske, supra note 2 (discussing shareholder derivative lawsuits following data breach-
es); see, e.g., Second Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws, 
supra note 56, at 2, 7–8 (alleging that a class of shareholders of Yahoo were harmed by failures to 
safeguard data and then properly disclosed the breach). 
 59 See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settle-
ment, supra note 2, at 7 (listing Anthem’s three-year auditing and reporting obligations to the plaintiff 
class of consumers); FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY UPDATE: 2017, at 4–5 
(2018) (listing significant FTC enforcement actions for data security violations in 2017); Resolution 
Agreement between Anthem, Inc. and Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. 2–3 (Oct. 15, 2018), https://
www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/anthem-ra-cap.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3U5-2GWK] (obligating An-
them to pay $16 million to the Department of Health and Human Services and to implement corrective 
measures subject to audit for two years); see also Resolution Agreements, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HU-
MAN SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-enforcement/agreements/index.
html [https://perma.cc/G27Z-J8UL] (listing HIPAA violations and resolution agreements). 
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Many claims are brought against breached entities by other businesses.60 
Banks and other financial institutions often assume substantial costs by resolv-
ing fraudulent charges, reimbursing victims, and bringing claims for indemni-
fication through the complex network of contracts that govern the payment 
card industry.61 Data is frequently transferred between organizations and data 
processing vendors with the liabilities often governed by contract.62 Breached 
organizations that hold insurance policies must frequently litigate whether the 
breached entity fulfilled whatever obligations they assumed in the agreement 
or whether they were at fault in some way that would preclude a payout.63 
B. Consumer Data Breach Litigation: A Wild Horse Like No Other 
Common law theories and traditional enforcement schemes that adequate-
ly served the physical world are often an imperfect fit when applied to cyber 
issues.64 One of the most prescient examples of this is the evolution of inter-
                                                                                                                           
 60 See Maleske, supra note 2 (discussing data breach litigation brought by businesses and pay-
ment card industry actors); see also, e.g., Lone Star Nat’l Bank v. Heartland Payment Sys., 729 F.3d 
421, 423 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding that the issuer banks were sufficiently foreseeable victims of Heart-
land’s negligence to allow a negligence claim in the absence of a contractual remedy). 
 61 See Dawn Causey et al., Banks Turn to the Courts for Data Breach Claims, ABA BANKING J. 
(Sept. 13, 2018), https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2018/09/banks-turn-to-the-courts-for-data-breach-
claims/ [https://perma.cc/FP4U-P67F] (noting that banks often incur the costs of fraudulent charges 
and identity theft resulting from third-party breaches). Card-issuing banks are required by federal law 
to indemnify card-holders for certain fraudulent charges. See 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (2018) (limiting 
credit-card-holder liability for unauthorized use); Cmty. Bank of Trenton v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 887 
F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 2018) (discussing that financial institutions must seek indemnification for their 
fees through the web of contracts connecting the many intermediaries involved in payment card pro-
cessing); 12 C.F.R. § 205.6 (2020) (limiting debit-card-holder liability for unauthorized use); see also 
Schnuck Mkts., Inc. v. First Data Merch. Servs. Corp., 852 F.3d 732, 735–39 (8th Cir. 2017) (explor-
ing the intricacies of this contractual relationship following a data breach). 
 62 See, e.g., Silverpop Sys., Inc. v. Leading Mkt. Techs., Inc., 641 Fed. App’x 849, 851 (11th Cir. 
2016) (discussing the data breach that occurred when a vendor’s system was compromised and grant-
ed access to the principal’s systems); see also infra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing state 
statutes that require covered businesses to contractually obligate third parties to security standards). 
 63 See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 9, at 229–36 (discussing the trends of data breach coverage and 
how costs are increasing); see, e.g., RSVT Holdings, LLC v. Main St. Am. Assurance Co., 136 A.D.3d 
1196, 1198 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (holding that data breach liability costs were excluded from the 
general liability policy). But see Travelers Indem. Co. v. Portal Healthcare Sols., L.L.C., 644 F. App’x 
245, 248 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding that a general liability policy covered data breach costs and litiga-
tion). It is becoming rarer for both general liability policies and specialized cyber insurance policies to 
cover data breaches as claims become more prevalent. See generally Kesan & Hayes, supra note 9, at 
248–63 (studying cyber-insurance policy litigation data and finding that such cases are increasing and 
are more often won by insurers). Additionally, these policies are often capped and these policy limits 
have been decreasing over the previous years. See COUNCIL OF INS. AGENTS & BROKERS, supra note 
49, at 4–5. 
 64 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LE-
GAL F. 207 (arguing that novel situations in cyberlaw can be accounted for by properly understanding 
how traditional doctrines apply); Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 
(1998) (arguing in favor of traditional enforcement schemes despite new difficulties posed by connec-
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mediary liability doctrines to address the issue of piracy and intellectual prop-
erty infringement on the internet.65 The traditional doctrines that previously 
accounted for the needs of the copyright holders struggled with the scale of 
activity the internet enables, as well as whether some solutions were even 
technologically feasible.66 This led to the passage of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act that created a compliance scheme that obviated some of these 
difficulties by clarifying liabilities and duties in this new dynamic.67 
Much of the common law evolved to force those who posed the risk to 
another to internalize the cost of that risk.68 In the data breach context, the 
boundaries of many of these common law principles are tested by the novel 
dynamic of risks posed by the data economy.69 Pre-trial litigation essentially 
comprises the entirety of the battle: no data breach case has gone to trial, and 
merely surviving a motion to dismiss, one of the lowest thresholds for the via-
bility of a claim, is a huge victory for plaintiffs.70 In many cases, the outcome 
                                                                                                                           
tivity); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
501 (1999) (exploring the differences between the physical world and the virtual world and how key 
differences frustrate some attempts to apply common law doctrines); David G. Post, Against “Against 
Cyberanarchy,” 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365 (2002) (making the exceptionalist argument caution-
ing against traditional regulation of the poorly understood internet). 
 65 See Lemley & Reese, supra note 5, at 1354–56 (detailing the trend that emerged in internet 
infringement cases of suing the facilitators of infringing conduct rather than the actual perpetrators for 
several strategic reasons). See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417 (1984) (determining the standard for intermediary liability that prevented producers of VHS cas-
sette tapes from being held liable for facilitating the infringing actions of others because they were 
capable of substantial non-infringing uses); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 
Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (dismissing claims of infringement against online service 
provider on contributory and vicarious liability theories). 
 66 See Lemley & Reese, supra note 5, at 1374–77 (explaining how the connectivity of the internet 
shifted the dynamics of copyright infringement and frustrated traditional enforcement schemes). 
 67 See id. at 1346–49 (recounting the development of secondary liability in digital copyright in-
fringement cases, the passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to clarify this liability, and the 
subsequent limitations to its provisions by various court rulings); see also Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 68 See Kneisner & Leeth, supra note 5, at 573–74 (explaining how tort theories evolved to ac-
count for market failures that fail to efficiently or equitably allocate the costs of unsafe products); 
Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 
384–88 (1988) (exploring products liability and how industry developments have both frustrated and 
shaped developments in this field). 
 69 See N.Y. CYBER TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 6–9 (noting cybersecurity issues that have ex-
isted since the 1970s); SCHNEIER, supra note 8, at 31–33 (discussing the systemic difficulties of cy-
bersecurity); E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW, supra note 4, § 2.02[1] (discussing how the com-
mon law has evolved to meet the challenges of cyberspace); see also Lemley & Reese, supra note 5, 
at 1379–81 (explaining how intermediary liability theories in online copyright infringement cases do 
not adequately deter the behavior of the actual infringing actor). 
 70 See, e.g., In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., 327 F.R.D. at 317–18 (assessing the fairness of 
the proposed settlement terms in reference to the risk and expense of further litigation in an area lack-
ing clear precedent); see also Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Appellees, supra note 5, at 23–24 (lamenting that large class action lawsuits like 
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of early proceedings influences whether parties will settle and what bargaining 
power each side has in such negotiations.71 
Data breach litigation shares key features with intellectual property in-
fringement litigation by seeking to hold intermediaries liable for the acts of 
third-parties under the theory that they had a duty to prevent such acts.72 Diffi-
culties in assessing technological capabilities and industry standards greatly 
complicate the development of workable standards of care.73 A similar lack of 
precedent encourages plaintiffs to creatively assert any and every cause of ac-
tion they think may survive a motion to dismiss due to the difficulty of predict-
ing which ones may succeed.74 
                                                                                                                           
those that follow breaches are rarely decided on the legal merits but rather result in in terrorem set-
tlements). 
 71 See Allison Grande, Data Breach Suits Find Easier Path with DC Circ. Ruling, LAW360 (Aug. 
3, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/951179/data-breach-suits-find-easier-path-with-dc-circ-
ruling [https://perma.cc/5KQG-CR64] (discussing the importance of standing and class certification to 
data breach plaintiffs and how venue selection is affected by the circuit split on standing); see, e.g., In 
re Yahoo! Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 16-MD-02752-LHK, 2019 WL 387322, at *5–8 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2019) (detailing the thorough procedural history of the consolidated multi-district 
litigation as it pertained to class size and certification leading up to the proposed settlement); Plain-
tiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, supra note 2, at 
4–6 (providing a timeline of the class certification process and concurrent mediation sessions that 
resulted in a proposed settlement). 
 72 See Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 392–94 (6th Cir. 2016) (Batchel-
der, J., dissenting) (dissenting due to the intervening third party criminal act breaking chain of causa-
tion); see also Lemley & Reese, supra note 5, at 1346–49 (explaining the emergence of suing the 
facilitators of online infringement activity rather than the actual perpetrators). 
 73 See, e.g., LabMD, Inc., 894 F.3d at 1236–37 (finding the FTC order too vague to enforce due to 
a complete lack of meaningful standards). The court imagined a scenario where such standards were 
litigated and found it to be unworkable given the lack of industry consensus on what security features 
are reasonable. Id.; see Brief of the National Technology Security Coalition as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Petitioner and Vacatur at 13–17, 19–21, LabMD, Inc., 894 F.3d 1221 (No. 9357) (advocating 
that the proposed FTC standards were based on a hindsight analysis of the attack and that the uncer-
tain compliance standard laid out would present compliance issues and have adverse consequences on 
the industry). 
 74 See, e.g., Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Health Care All., 254 F. App’x 664, 665 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(affirming the grant of summary judgment against a claim that attempted to analogize data breaches to 
and extend precedent from cases involving exposure to toxic substances with unclear future risks that 
are remedied with pre-harm medical monitoring); see also Price V. Fishback & Shawn E. Kantor, The 
Adoption of Workers’ Compensation in the United States, 1900–1930, 41 J.L. & ECON. 305, 316 
(1998) (discussing the increase in litigation actions due to the uncertain legal standards surrounding 
workplace accidents prior to the implementation of the Workers’ Compensation system). See general-
ly Consolidated Master Complaint at 70–108, Fero v. Excellus Health Plan, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 3d 333 
(W.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 6:15-cv-06569) (alleging eight counts under common law theories including 
negligence, negligence per se, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment, as well as statutory causes of 
action under more than ten state statutes).  
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1. Standing 
One of the first major battlegrounds that data breach plaintiffs face is 
standing to sue under Article III of the United States Constitution, which de-
termines whether a federal court will even hear the case.75 Standing requires 
(1) an injury-in-fact, that is (2) fairly attributable to the conduct of the defend-
ant, and (3) that the harm is redressable through litigation.76 The ruling in 
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA has had significant implications on how 
courts regard unclear or difficult to calculate harms by raising the threshold of 
how likely these future harms are to materialize for standing to be found.77 The 
Supreme Court stated that speculative future harms must be “certainly impend-
ing” or pose a “substantial risk” of occurring in order for plaintiffs to satisfy 
the injury-in-fact prong.78 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (creating the standing requirement implicitly by levying the judi-
cial power to hear true cases in controversy to the courts); John Black, Developments in Data Security 
Breach Liability, 69 BUS. LAW. 199, 204 (2013) (discussing how standing provides a challenge for 
data breach plaintiffs). Generally, standing is a federal constitutional issue and does not bar state 
courts from hearing common law or state statutory causes of action—these are likely to be resolved by 
state constitutions. See generally Wyatt Sassman, A Survey of Constitutional Standing in State Courts, 
8 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES L. 349 (2016) (examining the development of state 
constitutional standing doctrines). Article III standing is of particular importance to data breach plain-
tiffs because the putative class is likely to be spread across all fifty states, so the federal court system 
is more advantageous and better able to accommodate a national class. See E-COMMERCE AND IN-
TERNET LAW, supra note 4, § 26.15 (discussing data privacy class action litigation and the benefits of 
federal court jurisdiction in handling large distributed classes). 
 76 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408–09 (2013) (detailing the requirements of 
Article III standing). While courts readily recognize the redressability of identity theft as it pertains to 
standing, credit monitoring and credit freezes remedy only some of the fraudulent activity and cannot 
protect against several other types of identity theft. See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 696–97 (finding the 
plaintiffs’ harms redressable through credit monitoring and reimbursement of costs); PRIVACY 
RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, IDENTITY THEFT MONITORING SERVICES 1–2 (rev. 2019) (stating that 
credit monitoring primarily protects against “new account fraud”). Credit monitoring will alert con-
sumers to when new accounts are opened in their name, but does not actually prevent it, nor does it 
prevent existing account fraud or tax fraud. PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, supra, at 1–2. Credit 
freezes prevent new accounts from being opened and new federal legislation has made such freezes 
free. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-1(a)(i) (2018) (requiring consumer reporting agencies to provide 
consumers with free credit freezes upon request). 
 77 See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 408–09 (clarifying the Article III standing standard to be used for 
speculative future harms); Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 626–30 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (explaining 
the importance of Clapper in the data breach context). Clapper involved a challenge to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act and ultimately clarified that the objectively reasonable likelihood stand-
ard used by the Second Circuit did not suffice for standing. See 568 U.S. at 404–09. 
 78 Clapper, 568 U.S. at 408–09. At least one scholar has made the case that Clapper does not (or 
should not) present a challenge to data breach litigants who are asserting only increased risk of future 
injury. See Nicholas Green, Note, Standing in the Future: The Case for a Substantial Risk Theory of 
“Injury in Fact” in Consumer Data Breach Class Actions, 58 B.C. L. REV. 287, 288–89, 316 (2017) 
(discussing the case law support for a lower substantial risk threshold in a set of environmental and 
public harm cases that are in some ways analogous to data breach litigation).  
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Courts disagree over how to apply this standard and whether to extend 
standing to putative future victims.79 Plaintiffs who have already had their data 
misused and can prove damages generally have no issue alleging an injury-in-
fact, but the “certainly impending” standard is problematic for victims that on-
ly allege a heightened risk of future identity theft.80 In 2010, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held in Krottner v. Starbucks Corp. that the compromised 
consumers had alleged a credible threat of real and imminent harm because 
unencrypted PII had been maliciously stolen.81 In 2015, the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals held in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group that a malicious 
hacking attack essentially implies that damage will be forthcoming.82 The D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals similarly concluded in 2017 in Attias v. CareFirst, 
Inc. that the criminal aspect of a malicious data breach considerably lessens the 
speculative nature of future injuries.83 
                                                                                                                           
 79 Compare In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding that increased 
risk of identity theft suffices for Article III standing six years after the cases were filed and consoli-
dated), and Attias, 865 F.3d at 628 (finding that increased future risk of identity theft was sufficient 
for standing), and Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693 (same), with Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 266 (4th 
Cir. 2017) (finding increased risk of future identity theft insufficient for standing), and In re Super-
Valu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 774 (8th Cir. 2017) (same), with Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. 
App’x 89, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2017) (same), and Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(same). A District of Maryland court recently acknowledged in a consolidated set of bellwether claims 
testing the viability of various causes of action in regard to the Marriott breach that a “growing num-
ber of courts” have begun to recognize the loss of data as sufficient to establish injury-in-fact. See In 
re: Marriott Int’l, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., MDL No. 19-md-2879, 2020 WL 869241, 
at *9 (D. Md. Feb. 21, 2020) (finding sufficient loss of value resulting from the theft of personal in-
formation to establish injury-in-fact). 
 80 See, e.g., In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 774 (affirming dismissal of claims by plaintiffs 
alleging injury solely on the basis of increased future risk but finding standing for plaintiff who al-
leged actual injury). 
 81 See 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding standing for plaintiffs that had not yet suf-
fered harm, but faced a sufficient likelihood of future harm); see also In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 
at 1025 (finding that Krottner still controls data breach litigation in the Ninth Circuit following Clap-
per and Spokeo and that increased future risk from stolen credit card information suffices as a concrete 
injury). Krottner involved the physical theft of a laptop from Starbucks’s property, containing unen-
crypted employee data including the SSNs of approximately 97,000 employees. 628 F.3d at 1140. 
 82 See 794 F.3d at 693 (finding the harm less speculative when the data breach was perpetrated by 
criminal actors). Remijas involved a malware-based attack that allowed hackers to exfiltrate credit 
card data. Id. at 689–90. The Sixth Circuit also followed this reasoning. See Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 
387–89 (“There is no need for speculation where . . . data has already been stolen and is now in the 
hands of ill-intentioned criminals.”). 
 83 See 865 F.3d at 628 (finding standing for plaintiffs who had yet to suffer harm). Attias involved 
the infiltration of a network of computers by hackers who were then able to access the allegedly im-
properly encrypted PII. Id. at 623. The District of Maryland echoed this rationale in their recent ruling 
in the multi-district litigation following the Marriott breach, stating that the strong evidence of mali-
cious conduct elevated the “actual and threatened harm out of the realm of speculation and into the 
realm of sufficiently imminent and particularized . . . .” See In re: Marriott Int’l, Inc., Customer Data 
Sec. Breach Litig., 2020 WL 869241, at *6 (comparing and distinguishing several cases with varying 
levels of evidence of misuse and finding that the facts of the Marriott breach supported a finding of 
standing). 
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While those circuits have found that unauthorized access implies misuse, 
others have required a stronger showing that the data was or will be misused to 
survive the pleading stage.84 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals found the risk 
of injury to be too speculative in 2011 in Reilly v. Ceridian, where forensic 
data showed that hackers had potentially gained access to data, but not that 
they definitively did so.85 Similar defects proved fatal in 2017 in the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Beck v. McDonald, in the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc, and in the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals in In re Supervalu, Inc.86 
Standing is especially important for data breach litigants because it can 
determine the size of the class of plaintiffs, and with it, their bargaining pow-
er.87 Generally, only a small subset of compromised data subjects can prove 
unreimbursed fraudulent charges, so the determination on whether plaintiffs 
who have yet to suffer harm may be included is highly determinative of the 
class size and whether the suit will be pursued beyond the class certification 
stage.88 The 2016 Supreme Court ruling in Spokeo, Inc., v. Robins, that proce-
dural violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act do not grant consumers stand-
ing without further injury that is both “concrete and particularized,” has had fur-
ther implications for data breach plaintiffs.89 This has limited potential class siz-
                                                                                                                           
 84 See, e.g., In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 774 (finding increased risk of future identity theft 
insufficient for standing); Beck, 848 F.3d at 266–67 (same); Whalen, 689 F. App’x at 90–91 (same); 
Reilly, 664 F.3d at 42 (same).  
 85 See 664 F.3d at 42 (finding increased risk of future identity theft insufficient for standing where 
it could not be shown that the hacker read or accessed the data or that they had malicious intent). 
 86 See In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 774 (affirming dismissal of claims by alleging injury 
solely on the basis of increased risk of identity theft); Beck, 848 F.3d at 266–67 (affirming the dismis-
sal and summary judgment of two joined cases involving physical data loss where it could not be 
definitively shown to have been stolen and not misplaced); Whalen, 689 F. App’x at 90–91 (affirming 
dismissal for lack of standing because plaintiff had already incurred and been reimbursed for fraudu-
lent charges and had canceled the compromised credit card). Beck involved two cases, one the physi-
cal theft of an unencrypted laptop and the other an instance of several boxes of records headed for 
storage being misplaced. 848 F.3d at 267–68. 
 87 See, e.g., Remijas, 794 F.3d at 695 (analyzing injury-in-fact when fraudulent charges had al-
ready been reimbursed and stating that these harms would not be redressable, but that these plaintiffs 
would still face the same risks of future identity theft that entitle them to mitigation expenses); Torres 
v. Wendy’s Co., 195 F. Supp. 3d 1278, 1283 (M.D. Fla. 2016) (dismissing the claims of plaintiffs who 
had already been reimbursed for fraudulent charges as this negated any actual harm). Far beyond the 
scope of this Note are the issues of class certification, but class size is of great importance to data 
breach litigants. See 140 AM. JUR. TRIALS 327, § 8 (2020) (discussing why class action suits tend to 
be beneficial in the data breach context). Due to the fairly low individual harms most data breaches 
pose to a large group of data subjects, the costs of litigating such an issue would greatly outweigh the 
benefits to individual plaintiffs from doing so. See id. § 16; see also Black, supra note 75, at 204 (dis-
cussing “[d]ata breach class certification hurdles”). 
 88 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 89 See 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1544 (2016) (stating that procedural violations of the Fair Credit Report-
ing Act (FCRA) do not suffice for Article III standing without some further provable injury as a result 
of the violation); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018) (creating jurisdiction for federal courts to hear 
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es in statutory causes of action because even if the breach has violated the stat-
ute, plaintiffs must plead some further concrete injury to be granted standing.90 
Plaintiffs’ pleadings are tested early in regards to causation as well, with 
courts requiring some level of proof that the breach caused the fraudulent 
charges or increased risk of harm prior to discovery.91 The Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals found in Remijas that plaintiffs had standing to sue despite 
several data breaches occurring around the same time that could have exposed 
that data.92 The court stated that the breach notifications received by the class of 
plaintiffs rendered their claims sufficiently unspeculative to proceed and that any 
claims that the harm was caused by other breaches would be borne out at a later 
stage of the litigation.93 
2. Torts and Contracts 
Many data breach litigants bring causes of action alleging negligence or 
privacy torts against organizations that fail to protect their data.94 These claims 
face difficulty on a number of fronts concerning the duty of care owed to con-
sumers and how to qualitatively evaluate what that duty of care requires.95 
                                                                                                                           
private causes of action on the basis of violations of the FCRA). The FCRA created both public regu-
latory duties for consumer reporting agencies as well as giving wronged consumers a private cause of 
action under the statute. 15 U.S.C. § 1681. The Spokeo ruling has implications for any statutory cause 
of action as standing will no longer be granted for bare procedural violations but requires a further 
showing of injury. See 136 S. Ct. at 1544. 
 90 See, e.g., Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2019) (dismissing negligence 
per se claim because plaintiffs did not adequately allege actual harm). Spokeo has had implications for 
potential negligence per se claims that allege violation of a statute that establishes a duty, because 
plaintiffs must still plead actual harm. See id.; see also In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data 
Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 631, 639–40 (3d Cir. 2017) (determining that plaintiffs pleaded a suffi-
ciently concrete and particularized claim under the FCRA). 
 91 See, e.g., Remijas, 794 F.3d at 696 (considering the causation prong of Article III standing). At 
least one judge, however, has opined that causation cannot be established in hacking breaches because 
the third-party criminal act breaks the chain of causation. See Galaria, 663 F. App’x 392–94 (6th Cir. 
2016) (Batchelder, J., dissenting). 
 92 See 794 F.3d at 696 (considering the causation prong of Article III standing in a case involving 
a data breach that occurred close in time to another major breach and finding that plaintiffs had never-
theless made sufficient allegations for standing purposes). 
 93 Id. 
 94 See, e.g., Rollins v. City of Albert Lea, 79 F. Supp. 3d 946, 960–62 (D. Minn. 2014) (dismiss-
ing a privacy tort claim of intrusion upon seclusion); In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach 
Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1172–76 (asserting a claim of negligence as a breach of duty to reasonably 
safeguard the data); Rowe v. Unicare Life & Health Ins. Co., No. 09 C 2286, 2010 WL 86391, at *9 
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2010) (denying a motion to dismiss for plaintiffs’ invasion of privacy claims after 
personal health information had been exposed online due to improper security). See generally Jordan 
Elias, Course Correction—Data Breach as Invasion of Privacy, 69 BAYLOR L. REV. 574 (discussing 
the use of privacy torts in data breach actions). 
 95 See LabMD, Inc., 894 F.3d at 1236–37 (explaining the difficulty of applying a reasonable secu-
rity standard across many types of organizations). Should a data breach case ever go to trial, proving 
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They also depend heavily on state law precedents and can be further compli-
cated by the multijurisdictional nature of data breach suits.96 
Negligence claims are plead as a breach of duty to reasonably safeguard 
the data or the negligent misrepresentation that the data would be secure.97 The 
existence of this duty can be unclear in the absence of a contract and some 
courts even hold that the presence of a contract precludes additional recovery 
in tort.98 Plaintiffs who can establish a duty of care would then face the chal-
lenge of framing the defendants’ behavior as a breach of that duty, requiring a 
highly technical analysis of an organization’s preparedness and the facts of the 
breach.99 
Negligence claims are sometimes barred by the economic loss doctrine of 
torts that limits recovery for economic damages when unaccompanied by 
property damage or physical injury.100 The economic loss doctrine traditionally 
served as a limitation to liability as a matter of public policy; holding organiza-
tions liable for the unforeseeable economic harms created indirectly by their 
actions could potentially create excessive litigation and an unworkable eco-
nomic system.101 In regards to data breach litigation, some states adhere to this 
policy strictly, while others apply it subject to exceptions based on whether an 
independent duty, special relationship, or foreseeability of harm exists between 
the parties.102 
                                                                                                                           
reasonable security measures were taken would be a highly contentious issue barring obvious gross 
negligence. See id. 
 96 See, e.g., In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1172–76 
(discussing the common law precedents of eleven different states in an attempt to determine which 
states’ residents will be included in the plaintiff class); In re: Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach 
Litig., 11 F. Supp. 3d 1338, 1339 (J.P.M.L. 2014) (transferring those thirty-three actions pending in 
eighteen federal districts to the District of Minnesota, but also noting an additional seventy one poten-
tially joinable actions pending in thirty five districts). 
 97 See, e.g., In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1170; In re 
Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1311 (D. Minn. 2014) (denying 
a motion to dismiss for negligent misrepresentation by omission claim). 
 98 See, e.g., Attias, 365 F. Supp. 3d at 17–26 (D.D.C. 2019) (finding that the presence of a con-
tractual arrangement precluded tort recovery and dismissing several tort theories of recovery, but 
allowing unjust enrichment claims to go forward). 
 99 See LabMD, Inc., 894 F.3d at 1236–37 (musing on the difficulty of potentially litigating such a 
technical analysis); 140 AM. JUR. TRIALS 327, supra note 88, § 18 (explaining the difficulties posed 
by the technical aspects of data breach cases and that expert witnesses and discovery are often needed 
to assess the merits of a potential breach of a duty to safeguard data). 
 100 See, e.g., Longenecker-Wells, 2015 WL 5576753, at *5 (finding a negligence claim precluded 
by the economic loss doctrine); In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 
at 1171–76 (discussing the economic loss rule under the common law of more than ten states and the 
District of Columbia). 
 101 See, e.g., Longenecker-Wells, 2015 WL 5576753, at *15–17 (citing the policy argument in 
favor of limiting tort liability that would otherwise put undue strain on industry and the economy as a 
reason for dismissal of negligence claim). 
 102 See Attias, 2019 WL 367984, at *11 (finding no independent duty that would bar the econom-
ic loss rule from precluding the tort claims); Target, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1171–76 (discussing the various 
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The transactional nature of many data subject-data controller relationships 
means that there are often several putative contract claims that can be al-
leged.103 The ubiquitous online contracts generally include privacy policies 
that guarantee protective efforts against unauthorized disclosures and plaintiffs 
can assert that this guarantee was deceptive or simply breached.104 In some 
states, statutes require companies to provide their privacy policy to any pro-
spective data subject.105 As a result, many contract theories of recovery are 
employed by data breach litigants including breach of contract, unjust enrich-
ment, and other common law contract theories.106 Additionally, instances arise 
where no formal contract is signed, but plaintiffs allege a breach of implied 
contract, often arising from a payment card transaction.107 
                                                                                                                           
formulations and exceptions of state economic loss rules barring negligence claims); Caroline M. 
Sharkey, Can Data Breach Claims Survive the Economic Loss Rule?, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 339, 357 
(discussing the differences in state economic loss doctrines and exceptions). 
 103 See, e.g., Amended Complaint for Gross Negligence; Bailment; Breach of Implied Contract; 
Breach of Express Contract et al. at 17–20, In re: YAHOO! Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 
2019 WL 387322 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 16-MD-02752-LHK) (outlining the claims of breach of ex-
press contract, breach of bailment, and violation of state consumer protection act). See generally Con-
solidated Master Complaint, supra note 74, at 77–88 (alleging breach of contract, breach of implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, third-party beneficiary claim for breach of contract under 
federal law, negligent misrepresentation of the security practices purportedly guaranteed by their pri-
vacy policy, and unjust enrichment). 
 104 See, e.g., FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 240–41 (3d Cir. 2015) (describ-
ing the FTC’s allegations that Wyndham’s guarantees of security were deceptive). Simply giving 
users an opportunity to read the contract is usually sufficient to put them on inquiry notice that they 
are agreeing to terms of use; many standard internet browsewrap contracts instruct consumers that 
proceeding with the use of the service constitutes agreement without requiring them to actually click 
into or read the terms. See, e.g., Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 834–41 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(discussing browsewrap and clickwrap contracts and the inquiry notice standard). Another standard 
type of internet contract, the clickwrap contract, does require users to click into and sometimes scroll 
through the terms of use before they are allowed to accept them. See id.  
 105 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575 (West 2020) (requiring organizations that collect 
PII to create and provide consumers with a privacy policy); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 501.052 
(West 2019) (requiring the same for organizations that collect SSNs). 
 106 See, e.g., Attias, 2019 WL 367984 at *5, *7–8 (analyzing plaintiffs’ claims of breach of con-
tract and loss of benefit of the bargain theories); In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 
66 F. Supp. 3d at 1176–78 (discussing plaintiffs’ claims of breach of implied contract, breach of con-
tract, and unjust enrichment); Consolidated Master Complaint, supra note 74, at 77–88 (alleging 
breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, third-party beneficiary 
claim for breach of contract under federal law, negligent misrepresentation of the security practices 
purportedly guaranteed by their privacy policy, and unjust enrichment). 
 107 See e.g., In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1176–78 
(discussing plaintiffs’ claims of breach of implied contract arising from their use of a credit card that 
putatively guarantees the secure use of that payment card as part of the transaction); Anderson v. 
Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151, 159 (1st Cir. 2011) (alleging successfully that an implied contract 
was created with the merchant by the credit card transaction); Lovell v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, 
Inc., No. C14-1152-RSL, 2015 WL 4940371 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 27, 2015) (finding that a unilateral 
expectation of payment card security did not create an implied contract). 
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3. Regulatory Enforcement, State and Federal Statutes, and the General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of the European Union 
Despite the absence of an overarching cybersecurity statute, or perhaps as 
a result of it, both data subjects and government entities often attempt to bring 
actions under various federal and state statutes.108 Federal statutes such as the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and 
Graham-Leach-Bliley Act have created information security duties on certain 
industries or types of data.109 The Fair Credit Reporting Act established a duty 
for consumer reporting agencies to avoid unauthorized disclosures of consum-
er data and created a private cause of action that data subjects have used to 
assert violations directly.110 Publicly traded companies are governed by the 
Securities Exchange Act that creates both regulatory and shareholder causes of 
action in the wake of data breaches.111 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has emerged as the main federal 
regulator of data breaches through its general consumer protection powers as 
well as by narrow grants of sector-specific statutory authority.112 Section Five 
                                                                                                                           
 108 See Boyne, supra note 3, at 299–304, 332–33 (detailing the federal legislation and regulatory 
environment that has emerged due to the lack of a comprehensive framework on data security). See 
generally In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1161–66 (discussing 
the claims brought under the consumer protection statutes of forty-nine states and the District of Co-
lumbia in the consolidated multijurisdictional litigation); Consolidated Master Complaint, supra note 
74, at 89–108 (alleging causes of action under state consumer protection laws, state data breach stat-
utes, and state insurance statutes). 
 109 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.) (creating data security standards for finan-
cial data); Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6505 
(2018) (creating requirements for the collection of personal information from children under the age 
of thirteen); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.) (creating data security and risk disclosure obligations 
for publicly traded companies); Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections in 18 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C) 
(creating data security standards for health information). 
 110 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (creating a private cause of action for liability under the FCRA); In re 
Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d at 631 (detailing the alleged violation of 
the FCRA asserted as a cause of action by the plaintiffs).  
 111 See, e.g., Second Amended Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities 
Laws, supra note 56, at 2–8 (alleging that a class of shareholders of Yahoo stock were harmed by 
failures to safeguard data and to disclose the breach); see also Commission Statement and Guidance 
on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosures, supra note 50, at *7–13 (providing guidance on dis-
closure obligations for material cybersecurity risks and incidents); DIV. OF CORP. FIN., SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE: TOPIC NO. 2: CYBERSECURITY (Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.
sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm [https://perma.cc/W3TP-Y25C] (creating 
cybersecurity risk disclosure obligations and the basis for shareholders to file derivative suits in the 
context of data breaches for failure to disclose cybersecurity risks or failure to take adequate measure 
to reduce this risk). 
 112 See E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW, supra note 4, § 27.06 (describing a history of FTC 
enforcement actions for cybersecurity failures); Boyne, supra note 3, at 300–04 (detailing the FTC’s 
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of the FTC Act grants the FTC the power to bring general consumer protection 
enforcement actions against deceptive or unfair trade practices; although it was 
never expressly authorized to use this power in data security actions, it was 
allowed to do so in 2015 by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in FTC v. 
Wyndham Worldwide Corp.113 The Third Circuit found that representations of 
adequate data security practices to consumers in privacy policies could be 
characterized as an unfair business practice when such practices were clearly 
not implemented.114 
Despite some limits to the precedent set in Wyndham, the FTC has issued a 
series of enforcement actions, data security rules, and consent decrees that re-
semble post-breach settlements.115 Businesses are generally willing to enter into 
these agreements to appease regulators, but the Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals 2018 ruling in LabMD, Inc. v. FTC illustrates the limitations that regulators 
still face in data breach enforcement actions.116 The Eleventh Circuit neither 
firmly held nor disclaimed FTC authority over data breaches, but instead ruled 
that the FTC’s order requiring LabMD to implement reasonable security 
measures was too vague given the lack of clear industry cybersecurity standards 
and could not be enforced.117 
All fifty state legislatures have now passed some form of data breach no-
tification law.118 Some of these notification laws give consumers private causes 
                                                                                                                           
regulatory authority under both § 5 of the FTC Act and various statutory grants of authority); see also 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 59, at 4–5 (detailing numerous enforcement actions). 
 113 See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (codifying the Fair Trade Commission Act grant of power to the FTC to 
bring enforcement actions for unfair or deceptive business practices); Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 
799 F.3d at 244–46 (finding that Wyndham’s failure to deliver on the security promised by their pri-
vacy policy could have misled consumers and was unfair); see also LabMD, Inc., 894 F.3d at 1237 
(vacating the FTC’s cease-and-desist order directing LabMD to implement reasonable security due to 
the vagueness of what this requires). The court in LabMD did not reach the issue of FTC enforcement 
powers but nor did it expressly disclaim them. See 894 F.3d at 1231, 1237. 
 114 See Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d at 244–46 (finding that the representation of ade-
quate data security practices was clearly unfair considering Wyndham’s awareness of repeated 
breaches of their networks). 
 115 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 52, at 4–5 (detailing some of the recent enforcement 
actions); E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW, supra note 4, § 27.06 (listing several FTC consent de-
crees related to cybersecurity failings); see also 16 C.F.R. § 318.3 (2020) (promulgating the FTC’s 
Health Breach Notification Rule, a data breach notification obligation for entities possessing health 
information but not covered by HIPAA rules on breach notification). 
 116 See 894 F.3d at 1237 (demonstrating the limits of FTC enforcement powers due to lack of 
clear standards and industry consensus on what constitutes reasonable security). 
 117 See id. at 1231 (assuming arguendo that the FTC can enforce the alleged negligent failure to 
implement reasonable data security measures as an unfair act or practice); id. at 1236–37 (posing a 
hypothetical scenario of trying to litigate such technology industry standards when considerable room 
for disagreement tends to exist in that sector); see also In re LabMD, Inc., 102 F.T.C. 3099, at *34-35 
(2016) (ordering LabMD to comply with several security practices and reporting obligations for a 
period of twenty years). 
 118 Breach Notification Laws, supra note 56 (listing state breach notification statutes for all fifty 
states). 
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of action for failures to notify whereas others vest this power solely to the 
state’s attorney general.119 States often have their own consumer protection 
laws that create private causes of action or call for enforcement by regulatory 
bodies.120 Eighteen states have set “reasonable” security standards for busi-
nesses that own or license the personal information of residents and seven re-
quire businesses to contractually extend this requirement to any third-parties 
who will handle that data.121 
A small subset of states have enacted unique legislation or regulations 
that create further cybersecurity obligations.122 Massachusetts enacted the 
Written Information Security Procedures regulation in 2010 that created stand-
ardized requirements for the creation and maintenance of security plans and 
risk assessments.123 The New York Division of Financial Services promulgated 
a new regulation that creates extra compliance cybersecurity obligations for 
financial services companies that operate in New York.124 Vermont passed a 
law requiring data brokers to register with the state and report certain infor-
mation.125 California passed several cybersecurity laws in 2018, including the 
California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), which parallels the General Data 
Protection Regulation of the European Union (GDPR) in several ways and will 
create private causes of action as well as public enforcement actions for the 
misuse of data.126 California also passed what is being hailed as the first Inter-
                                                                                                                           
 119 See E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW, supra note 4, § 27.08[10][A] (exploring the enforce-
ment mechanisms created by the various state statutes); see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.84 (West 
2020) (creating a private cause of action for violations of a breach notification statute); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 445.72(13) (West 2020) (granting enforcement powers to the state Attorney General). 
 120 See In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1172–76 (alleging 
violations of various state consumer protection statutes); E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW, supra 
note 4, § 27.08[10][C] (exploring the regulatory enforcement powers created by state data breach 
notification statutes, often vested in state attorneys general). 
 121 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5 (West 2020) (establishing that businesses that own or 
license personal data of residents have an obligation to implement reasonable security procedures as well 
as contractually bind any third parties who will handle the data to this standard); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 6-1-713.5(2) (West 2020) (same); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3503 (West 2020) (same); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 603A.210 (West 2019) (same); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.052(a) (West 
2019) (establishing a standard of protection, but not a requirement to extend this duty via contract). 
 122 E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.91.04 (West 2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 §§ 2446–2447 (West 
2019); 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.00–17.05 (2020); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500 
(2020). 
 123 201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.00. 
 124 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500. The regulation applies to entities operating in 
the financial services industry and creates enhanced cybersecurity and risk assessment obligations, 
including mandatory penetration testing and vulnerability assessments. Id. 
 125 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 §§ 2446–2447. The data broker law requires annual registration and 
disclosure of various pieces of information regarding the collection, usage, and sale of the data. Id. 
§ 2446. It also establishes a duty to implement and maintain a comprehensive data security program 
including employee training and technical safeguards. Id. § 2447. 
 126 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (West 2020) (codifying the California Consumer Privacy Act); 
Joseph V. Moreno et al., The Digital Revolution Takes on New Meaning: Among Calls for Heightened 
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net-of-Things cybersecurity law in the United States, creating security imple-
mentation and design obligations for producers of connected goods.127 The 
California laws may come to act as de facto federal legislation due to the size 
and importance of the California market, which likely will make it cheaper to 
simply comply with the laws across the board rather than develop state-
specific data safety practices.128 
The GDPR recently enacted by the European Union (EU) is arguably the 
most comprehensive data protection regime promulgated to date.129 It applies 
to any entity that holds data on citizens of the EU and sets out rules for the col-
lection, handling, and processing of that data.130 Most significantly, it encour-
ages compliance by prescribing extreme penalties—the higher of twenty million 
euros or four percent of global yearly revenue can be assessed on particularly 
culpable violators.131 Additionally, it allows for executives and board members 
to face liability for data breaches.132 A recent survey calculated over fifty nine 
thousand breaches reported under the GDPR between May 2018 and January 
2019, and the number of major GDPR fines increased significantly in 2019 over 
the year prior.133 
                                                                                                                           
U.S. Data Privacy Measures, California Is King, NAT’L L. REV. (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.natlaw
review.com/article/digital-revolution-takes-new-meaning-among-calls-heightened-us-data-privacy-
measures [https://perma.cc/84DM-BUZ2] (discussing the impacts of the California Consumer Privacy 
Act and comparing several of its provisions to those of the GDPR); Cybersecurity Legislation 2018, 
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/cybersecurity-legislation-2018.aspx [https://perma.cc/577K-CNJ8] (listing the cybersecurity 
legislation passed by California in 2018). 
 127 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.91.04 (creating security design and implementation obligations 
for connected devices manufactured or sold in California); Timothy Tobin et al., California Passes 
First-of-Its-Kind Law Focused on Internet of Things Cybersecurity, HOGAN LOVELLS (Oct. 17, 2018), 
https://www.hldataprotection.com/2018/10/articles/consumer-privacy/california-passes-first-of-its-
kind-law-focused-on-internet-of-things-cybersecurity/ [https://perma.cc/S86H-78ZJ] (discussing the 
impact of this legislation).  
 128 See Travis Brennan et al., California Sets De Facto National Data Privacy Standard, CORP. 
COUNSEL BUS. J. (July 6, 2019), https://ccbjournal.com/articles/california-sets-de-facto-national-data-
privacy-standard [https://perma.cc/NDR5-QRGC] (speculating that it would be cost prohibitive for 
companies that operate on a national scale to develop platforms to cater to the various regulatory re-
quirements of each state, making it cheaper to simply comply with the most restrictive regime). 
 129 See generally Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 
2016, 2016 O.J. (L 119/1) (setting standards for the data protection and privacy laws of European 
Union member states). 
 130 See id. at art. 2 (providing material scope); id. at art. 3 (providing territorial scope). 
 131 See id. at Ch. VIII, art. 77 (noting remedies, liability and penalties); 6 DAVID BENDER,  COM-
PUTER LAW: A GUIDE TO CYBERLAW AND DATA PRIVACY LAW § 51.04 (rev. ed. 2019) (characteriz-
ing the severity of GDPR’s maximum fines as “draconian” in order to encourage compliance).  
 132 See Ffion Flockhart et al., Cyber Risk and Directors’ Liabilities: An International Perspective, 
NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (Dec. 2016), https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en-me/knowledge/
publications/b0dae4a0/cyber-risk-and-directors-liabilities-an-international-perspective [https://perma.
cc/N7DA-C48F] (detailing director liability in several European countries post-GDPR). 
 133 DLA PIPER, GDPR DATA BREACH SURVEY: FEBRUARY 2019, at 3 (2019) (examining some 
early data breach enforcement actions under the GDPR); Major GDPR Fine Tracker—An Ongoing, 
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II. (I CAN’T GET NO) DATA SECURITY 
This Part discusses how the search for a legal remedy for data breach vic-
tims has been impeded by the complexity and scope of the issue as well as the 
potential repercussions of expanding liability in this area.134 Section A utilizes 
key systemic features and economic concepts to explore the risks of the data 
economy and demonstrate the virtual impossibility of securing all consumer 
data.135 Section B discusses how these features interplay with the impacts that 
potential resolutions may have on the economy and innovation.136 
A. Guaranteed Insecurity: We Like Smart-Fridges More  
Than Privacy, So We Can’t Have Nice Things 
Several issues create a likelihood that identity theft will continue to in-
crease and pose challenges to the use of private liability as a regulator of risky 
behavior.137 First, the complexity of modern technology virtually assures con-
tinued vulnerability and makes litigation functionally impossible and overly 
cumbersome.138 Second, both consumers and organizations struggle to analyze 
the inherent risks of using personal data and fail to account for it, driving 
greater economic reliance on data.139 
1. Wile-E Coyote Looks Down: The Realization of Insecure Foundations 
The first issue is the inherently vulnerable architecture of the internet and 
the inability to achieve perfect security.140 The piecemeal series of additions, 
                                                                                                                           
Always Up-To-Date List of Enforcement Actions, ALPIN, https://alpin.io/blog/gdpr-fines-list/ [https://
perma.cc/EBF2-YVVN] (listing major GDPR enforcement actions). 
 134 See infra notes 137–200 and accompanying text. 
 135 See infra notes 137–178 and accompanying text. 
 136 See infra notes 179–200 and accompanying text. 
 137 See Shavell, supra note 16, at 366–69 (describing the conditions that allow traditional applica-
tions of liability to allocate costs efficiently); see also infra notes 138–178 and accompanying text. 
 138 See N.Y. CYBER TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 4, 8–9 (explaining the fundamental difficulties 
in cybersecurity due to the complexity and ad-hoc design of our networks as well as the lack of secure 
design); see also infra notes 139–149 and accompanying text. 
 139 See SCHNEIER, supra note 19, at 235–38 (discussing how the lack of certainty about the risks 
and the misalignment of priorities between individuals and the general population have resulted in 
consumers with a strong preference for data-augmented devices and driven data-based innovation); 
Alessandra Arcuri, Risk Regulation, in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 302, 324–25 (2d 
ed. 2012) (explaining how uncertainty disrupts the cost-benefit analysis); Benjamin E. Hermalin, 
Uncertainty and Imperfect Information in Markets, in HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF RISK AND 
UNCERTAINTY, supra note 5, at 263, 264–65 (discussing the concepts of imperfect information and 
information asymmetry and how they influence consumer preferences); see also infra notes 150–178 
and accompanying text. 
 140 See SCHNEIER, supra note 19, at 141–43 (discussing the attacker-defender dichotomy that 
makes cybersecurity so difficult); N.Y. CYBER TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 4, 8–9 (listing several 
reasons why cybersecurity is challenging on a technical level). 
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upgrades, and patches that the internet and network protocols have undergone 
have left us with a minefield of vulnerabilities that continue to grow with each 
new software version.141 There is no such thing as a bug-free program and the 
open-access design of many of these programs, a necessary design feature for 
most internet software that interacts with other programs, virtually assures that 
exploits will be found by those who dig hard enough.142 Many internet con-
nected organizations are reliant on an entire inventory of third party devices 
and software that create a web of vulnerabilities.143 
At best, a well patched product may prevent known attack vectors, but the 
“attacker’s advantage” in cybersecurity means that security professionals often 
learn of a vulnerability only after it has been exploited.144 Human nature can 
never be fault-free and sterling network architecture and personnel training can 
be undone by a single honest mistake, such as an employee falling victim to a 
phishing email and clicking a malicious link.145 
                                                                                                                           
 141 See MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 115TH CONG., REP. 
ON THE EQUIFAX DATA BREACH 54 (2018) (discussing how the forensic investigation of breaches is 
made difficult by complex networks); N.Y. CYBER TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 4, 8–9 (explaining 
the fundamental difficulties in cybersecurity due to the complexity and ad-hoc design of our networks 
as well as the lack of secure design); SCHNEIER, supra note 19, at 140–46 (detailing the vulnerabilities 
created by how complex computer systems are). 
 142 See N.Y. CYBER TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 8 (identifying the open access internet architec-
ture and buggy software as two key reasons why cybersecurity is so challenging); Black, supra note 6, 
at 1–2 (detailing the SARD database of over 170,000 currently known bugs); see also SCHNEIER, 
supra note 8, at 129 (“The reason we have the internet is that companies were able to market buggy 
products .If computers were subject to the same product liability regulations as stepladders, they prob-
ably wouldn’t be . . . on the market yet.”).  
 143 See SCHNEIER, supra note 8, at 20–33 (detailing the myriad design oversights that ensure a 
system with pervasive vulnerabilities); SCHNEIER, supra note 19, at 144–46 (explaining the wealth of 
endpoints in our interconnected system and the likely presence of hundreds of unknown vulnerabili-
ties in each). Many systems are compromised by the discovery of a single software vulnerability, as 
every system that runs the software is compromised until patched. SCHNEIER, supra note 8, at 31. 
 144 See N.Y. CYBER TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 4, 8–9 (explaining the fundamental advantages 
that attackers hold over defenders in cybersecurity); SCHNEIER, supra note 19, at 141 (detailing the 
imbalance of power in the attack-defense dynamic and how many vulnerabilities are discovered only 
after they have caused problems); Matthew Morgan et al., Network Attacks and the Data They Affect, 
in DYNAMIC NETWORKS AND CYBER-SECURITY 1, 4–6 (Niall M. Adams & Nicholas A. Heard eds., 
2016) (discussing the attacker’s advantage as a “cat and mouse” game where defenders must seek to 
close all vulnerabilities but attackers need only find a single one). 
 145 See IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., supra note 28, at 1–2 (discussing the scope of human-targeted 
attacks such as spearphishing and malware and how they are increasing in prevalence due to their 
effectiveness); SCHNEIER, supra note 8, at 45–46 (discussing the weaknesses in many authentication 
systems that rely on usernames and passwords and how easy it is for people to fall victim to credential 
theft); see also Steven Shavell, The Optimal Level of Corporate Liability Given the Limited Ability of 
Corporations to Penalize Their Employees, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 203, 203–04 (1997) (explain-
ing the limited deterrence effect of corporate liability on employee behavior as employees often face 
no personal liability and how their risk is usually limited to loss of their job). Credential stealing has 
become very easy, and efforts to phish, social engineer, or otherwise guess logins, passwords, and 
security phrases are often extremely effective and have led to high profile attacks. SCHNEIER, supra 
note 8, at 45–46. 
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Attackers are more motivated than ever to discover these profitable ex-
ploits, often from the comfort of a home country with no extradition agree-
ment.146 A large variety of attacks ranging in sophistication have been levied 
against numerous targets.147 Mothers’-basement-hackers require little more 
than a computer and an internet connection to gain access to guides and hacker 
tools to easily exploit known vulnerabilities.148 On the other end of the spec-
trum, sophisticated and well-funded hackers are likely able to use brute force 
or finesse their way into nearly any system of interest.149 
2. Incentivized Insecurity: Uncertainty and Imperfect Information, 
Externalities, and Information Asymmetry 
Uncertainty about the risks of compromised privacy results in imperfect 
information in the data market.150 Many of the costs of a data breach are borne 
by intermediaries, creating externalities for both consumers and organizations 
that muddle the cost-benefit analysis of participation in the data economy.151 
                                                                                                                           
 146 See Data Thieves: The Motivations of Cyber Threat Actors and Their Use and Monetization of 
Stolen Data, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism & Illicit Fin. of the H. Fin. Servs. Comm., 
115th Cong. 1–5 (2018) (statement of Lillian Ablon, Scientist, RAND Corporation) [hereinafter Data 
Thieves Hearing] (discussing the prevalence of cyberattacks and the different motivations for several 
types of cyberthieves); see also 112 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, § 1 (2020) (explaining the difficulties of 
targeting the actual identity thieves and why lawsuits tend to target more reachable intermediaries). 
 147 See Infographic: Identity Thief Toolkit, IRIS (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.irisidentityprotection.
com/blog/identity-thief-infographic/ [https://perma.cc/6PAF-KFT8] (listing the various cyber threats, 
such as whaling, smishing, vishing, pharming, and so forth); Internet Crime Complaint Center, FED. 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.ic3.gov/media/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/5LXB-HDP4] 
(tracking press releases concerning many different types of active cyber threats). 
 148 See Data Thieves Hearing, supra note 146, at 7–8 (explaining that there are negligible barriers 
to enter the black market for data given the tutorials, hackers for hire, and hacker tools available to 
anyone with an internet connection); LILLIAN ABLON & ANDY BOGART, RAND CORP., ZERO DAYS, 
THOUSANDS OF NIGHTS, at xi (2017) (discussing the market for purchase, sale, and trade of “zero-day 
vulnerabilities,” as yet unknown or addressed vulnerabilities); see also CARBON BLACK, THE RAN-
SOMWARE ECONOMY 2 (2017) (finding a 2,500% increase in black market ransomware sales from 
2016 to 2017); SCHNEIER, supra note 8, at 30 (discussing “script kiddie[s],” a term referring to un-
skilled hackers who use prepackaged hacker tools and scripts available for purchase or for free 
online). 
 149 See Data Thieves Hearing, supra note 146, at 3–5 (explaining that state-sponsored actors are 
often well funded and sophisticated, and their attacks are highly targeted and persistent). 
 150 See N.Y. CYBER TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 4, 8–9 (explaining the risks created by the 
widespread use of information technology and the lack of incentives for secure design); Arcuri, supra 
note 139, at 324–25 (explaining the effect of uncertain benefits and costs on rational decision-
making); Fazzini, supra note 11 (reporting the confusion of experts who have yet to identify any tradi-
tional uses of the Equifax data and that some suspect that more sophisticated actors may be at work). 
 151 See WEISS & MILLER, supra note 24, at 14–19 (presenting research on the many cost bearers 
from several large data breaches); see also MICHAEL POWER, ORGANIZED UNCERTAINTY 12–21 
(2007) (explaining the risk-uncertainty dichotomy and how risk analysis, and therefore behavior, 
differs across individuals, sectors, classes of actors, and even within organizations); Zhuang et al., 
supra note 9, at 16–18 (modeling a security market and finding considerable inefficiency due to many 
actors acting in their own interests).  
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Organizations routinely guarantee some level of data security to their data sub-
jects, but an information asymmetry is created by the inability of consumers to 
verify or evaluate such guarantees.152 Consumer willingness to trade personal 
data for value-adding features creates an incentive for businesses to participate 
in the data economy, but typically at the expense of privacy and security, 
which is treated as a poor investment.153 
Consumers’ failure to account for the risks and costs of compromised pri-
vacy can largely be attributed to their poor understanding of it.154 Nearly every 
app and web service has users agree to “terms of use” that give the companies 
broad leeway over how user data will be collected, used, and protected.155 A 
consumer looking to use a smart device or sign up for a “free” web service is 
unable to weigh what they are agreeing to due to the abstract nature of person-
al data risk.156 Even if they have a rough understanding of the known harms, 
the future risks of compromised personal data remain poorly understood even 
to experts.157 
Externalities also prevent consumers from fully understanding the risks 
and costs of compromised data.158 Fraudulent charges, the most concretely 
identifiable harm, are largely externalized onto financial institutions, so con-
sumers are unlikely to include such costs when consenting to the use of their 
data as they are unlikely to incur them personally.159 Similarly, much of the 
                                                                                                                           
 152 See SCHNEIER, supra note 8, at 133–34 (explaining how consumers have no practical way of 
determining whether companies are representing their security procedures accurately); George Aker-
lof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 
488–91, 495 (1970) (discussing how information asymmetries encourage dishonest behavior because 
buyers reward guarantees of quality, but cannot distinguish when these representations are false); see 
also Hermalin, supra note 139, at 264–65 (discussing information asymmetries). 
 153 See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 9, at 220–22 (explaining the incentives that prompt businesses 
to prioritize price over the security of connected products). 
 154 SCHNEIER, supra note 19, at 235–38 (writing on the unknowable effects of the mass usage of 
data and how uncertain harms affect our data-use preferences); see also Arcuri, supra note 139, at 
324–25 (explaining how uncertainty regarding the risks of a specific behavior affect the ability of 
decision makers to make efficient choices). 
 155 See Jonathan A. Obar & Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, The Biggest Lie on the Internet: Ignoring the 
Privacy Policies and Terms of Service Policies of Social Networking Services, 23 INFO., COMM., & 
SOC’Y 128, 129–31 (2020) (discussing the widespread adoption of privacy policies to comply with the 
“notice and choice” privacy framework of data collection). 
 156 See SCHNEIER, supra note 19, at 235–38 (explaining the nature of data risk to society as a 
whole and how individuals are prone to ignoring these distributed harms). 
 157 See SCHNEIER, supra note 8, at 50–51 (describing the unknown extent of future identity theft 
crimes); Fazzini, supra note 11 (discussing the confusion of cybercrime experts as to where the 
Equifax data has gone and what purpose it is being used for). 
 158 See SCHNEIER, supra note 19, at 235–38 (discussing how individuals do not incorporate the 
distributed group harms of data usage into their decision making); Kesan & Hayes, supra note 9, at 
220–21 (stating that externalities are pervasive in cybersecurity due to cost spreading and the distribu-
tion of harm from these activities over many stakeholders). 
 159 See 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (2018) (limiting consumer liability unless card issuers provide proper 
notification channels); 12 C.F.R. § 205.6 (2020) (limiting consumer liability for fraudulent charges 
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risk of harm is externalized to other data subjects.160 Consumer data is most 
valuable to both thieves and businesses when aggregated into massive data-
bases.161 Individual consumers often receive ample benefit from web services 
that justify the risk that their data may be compromised, but as more consum-
ers make this exchange, the risk to each data subject grows by virtue of aggre-
gating this data together and making it a riper target.162 
Many of the costs that data breaches pose to the breached entity are simi-
larly externalized onto consumers and intermediaries.163 Organizations are in-
centivized to invest only as much into cybersecurity as is likely to mitigate 
their own cost of a data breach rather than the entire cost.164 Employees of or-
ganizations are also affected by the unlikelihood that they will be personally 
held liable and have less incentive to improve behaviors when the company 
that be the one liable for their errors.165 
An information asymmetry regarding the level of protection on their data 
also prevents consumers from understanding the tradeoff between data and 
                                                                                                                           
only if reported in a timely fashion); HARRELL, VICTIMS OF IDENTITY THEFT 2016, supra note 32, at 
9 (finding that 88% of victims did not face out of pocket costs, mainly due to reimbursement or fraud 
protection by financial institutions); see also WEISS & MILLER, supra note 24, at 19 (listing the vari-
ous intermediaries who bear costs from a payment card data breach). 
 160 See SCHNEIER, supra note 19, at 235–38 (discussing how the total harm created by data 
breaches is very large, but tends to be low at an individual level when distributed amongst all stake-
holders). 
 161 See MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 115TH CONG., REP. 
ON THE EQUIFAX DATA BREACH 18 (2018) (discussing how the massive amount of consumer data 
held by credit reporting agencies has made them prime targets for attacks). 
 162 See SCHNEIER, supra note 19, at 235–38 (writing on the conflicting group and individual in-
terests that prevent individuals from understanding the cost of the “data trade-off” and mass usage of 
data); see also MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 115TH CONG., 
REP. ON THE EQUIFAX DATA BREACH 18 (2018) (remarking that data thieves are likely to target large 
data sets because they tend to be more profitable for the effort). 
 163 See WEISS & MILLER, supra note 24, at  5–7, 14–19  (listing the numerous cost bearers that 
resulted from several large data breaches); SCHNEIER, supra note 8, at 124–28 (lamenting the exter-
nalities that misalign the incentives of executives when it comes to investment into cyber risk man-
agement); Kesan & Hayes, supra note 9, at 220–21 (stating that externalities are pervasive in cyberse-
curity due to cost spreading). 
 164 See Zhuang et al., supra note 9, at 16–18 (modeling security investment preferences of indi-
viduals based on perceived risks to themselves rather than the total harm their activities may cause). 
When the perceived risk to the individual entity is smaller than the overall risk posed by the activity, 
the entity is only incentivized to insure their own potential risk exposure. Id. Similarly, the presence of 
various discount factors that reduce the expected return on security investments is likely to prompt 
less investment. Id. 
 165 See Shavell, supra note 16, at 362–63 (explaining that employees often face insufficient incen-
tives to reduce risks because they are both unlikely to bear the full cost of the harm nor face personal 
liability for it); Shavell, supra note 145, at 203–04 (explaining how employee decision makers are less 
incentivized to prevent harm to the organization because they will not experience the majority of this 
harm). 
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privacy.166 Consumers are likely to receive a generic assurance of reasonable 
security measures for the storage of their data, but have no feasible way to ver-
ify if this is the case.167 Most consumers either do not read or cannot under-
stand the functional effect of privacy policies and any alternative products are 
likely to have similar policies, reducing the ability of consumers to shop for 
greater security.168 Data brokers buy and sell this data per the agreed upon 
terms of use, and thus consumers are unlikely to even know who holds their 
personal data, let alone evaluate the security in place.169 
While consumers cannot accurately weigh the risks and have no way of 
knowing how well protected their data will be, they are exceedingly reactive to 
price.170 This creates what is known as a Lemons Market: there is no reliable 
return on investment for security, and as a result, the market is saturated with 
                                                                                                                           
 166 See Hermalin, supra note 139, at 264–65 (discussing imperfect information and information 
asymmetries). Even if this information asymmetry was resolved, however, it is unlikely to help on its 
own considering the uncertain risks of compromised privacy. See id. at 264 (explaining that the value 
of information is highest when risks are understood). 
 167 See SCHNEIER, supra note 8, at 133–34 (explaining how consumers have no practical way of 
determining whether companies are representing their security procedures accurately); Akerlof, supra 
note 152, at 488–91, 495 (discussing how information asymmetries create incentives for sellers be-
cause to buyers reward guarantees of quality, but cannot distinguish when these representations are 
false). 
 168 See Lior J. Strahilevitz & Matthew B. Kugler, Is Privacy Policy Language Irrelevant to Con-
sumers?, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 69, 92 (2016) (stating that lay consumers do not typically read privacy 
policies and that when they do they are unable to determine the legal significance of the terms and 
likely to interpret the clauses in a variety of ways); see also SCHNEIER, supra note 19, at 61 (“Opting 
out just isn’t a viable choice for most of us . . . . [I]t violates what have become very real norms of 
contemporary life.”). Even if organizations provided their data subjects with a more detailed account 
of the security procedures in place, consumers would struggle to evaluate the actual protection provid-
ed given the complexity of cybersecurity. See SCHNEIER, supra note 8, at 133–34 (proclaiming that it 
is difficult even for experts to evaluate guarantees of security). 
 169 See Bruce Schneier, It’s Not Just Facebook. Thousands of Companies Are Spying on You, CNN 
(Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/26/opinions/data-company-spying-opinion-schneier/
index.html [https://perma.cc/N5KS-RNT4] (explaining that thousands of data broker companies exist 
and purchase your data legally from those who have collected it). Schneier describes the data broker 
industry and how companies often sell their data to hundreds of others, so it is generally possible that 
a given consumer’s data is held by thousands of companies, each of them a potential vulnerability. See 
id. Users consent to this sale of their data in most of the terms of use that they agree to. Id. Additional-
ly, there are entities, such as credit reporting agencies like Equifax, that collect information on con-
sumers, yet never seek consent nor offer opt-outs. See MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT 
& GOV’T REFORM, 115TH CONG., REP. ON THE EQUIFAX DATA BREACH 13 (2018) (explaining that 
credit reporting agencies aggregate consumer data without seeking consent or providing an option to 
opt-out of this collection). 
 170 See SCHNEIER, supra note 8, at 134–35 (describing the information asymmetry that prevents 
consumers from understanding how secure their data actually is); SCHNEIER, supra note 19, at 235–38 
(discussing why individuals fail to understand the group risks posed by mass data collection); Akerlof, 
supra note 152, at 488–91, 495 (discussing how the information asymmetry created by a lack of relia-
ble indicators of quality favors lower quality products because these tend to be cheaper and consumers 
readily understand price). 
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vulnerable products.171 Businesses often take the role of consumer and entrust 
data to third-party software, vendors, or components subject to these same lim-
itations that prioritize low-cost over safety.172 
The great potential liability that data breaches bring is likely to lead to 
underinsurance in terms of cybersecurity investment.173 In some cases, the lia-
bility could exceed the value of the organization, and organizations have no 
incentive to insure beyond their assets.174 Most organizations simply cannot 
afford to budget a significant amount towards preparedness because it only 
provides a return on investment if they experience and detect a breach.175 Even 
if reasonable security is implemented, organizations would have to spend con-
siderable resources in litigation to prove this point, further reducing the incen-
tive to invest in cybersecurity.176 At best, organizations may be able to reduce 
the probability of a breach by investing in security, but the risk of data breach 
is pervasive.177 Cybersecurity preparedness provides diminishing returns after 
                                                                                                                           
 171 See SCHNEIER, supra note 8, at 133–35 (describing the lemons market created by cybersecuri-
ty information asymmetry that does not reward investments in cybersecurity); see also Akerlof, supra 
note 152, at 488–91, 495 (modeling the lemons market that emerges when purchasers are insensitive 
to quality); Hermalin, supra note 139, at 313–17 (discussing exogenous asymmetries of information 
with informed sellers and uninformed buyers and the resulting lemons model market); Zhuang et al., 
supra note 9, at 16–18 (modeling a dominant strategy of low investment in security when there are 
high investment costs and discount factors on their return on investment). 
 172 See Loren F. Selznick & Carolyn LaMacchia, Cybersecurity Liability: How Technically Savvy 
Can We Expect Small Business Owners to Be?, 13 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 217, 226–27 (2018) (detailing 
the complexity of the modules, software, and vendor services that many small businesses utilize and 
the difficulties they face in evaluating or prioritizing security). 
 173 See Steven Shavell, The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement, 36 J.L. & ECON. 255, 279–80 
(1993) (explaining that when organizations do not have the assets to cover potential liability, they are 
unlikely to be motivated to reduce risks if the risky behavior otherwise generates value). 
 174 See Shavell, supra note 16, at 360–63 (discussing when risky behaviors go underinsured be-
cause the cost of the direct harm is externalized or otherwise exceeds the assets of the organization 
and limits potential liability to that amount); Shavell, supra note 173, at 279–80 (stating that when the 
liability of an organization is capped, such as the amount it would take to go bankrupt, they are un-
likely to insure beyond that amount and are thus likely to engage in underinsured risky behaviors). 
 175 See Shavell, supra note 16, at 364 (describing the advantage of underinsuring against “unlike-
ly” events as they only produce a return on investment if the event occurs); see also Selznick & 
LaMacchia, supra note 172, at 226–27 (discussing the cybersecurity dilemma faced by many small 
businesses with limited resources). 
 176 See Shavell, supra note 16, at 368–69 (stating that liability is efficient when some administra-
tive costs can be avoided because suits will not be brought when entities are clearly in compliance 
with legal standards); see also LabMD, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 894 F.3d 1221, 1236–37 (11th 
Cir. 2018) (discussing the costs and required experts that litigating compliance to reasonable security 
would require). 
 177 See MARTIN C. LIBICKI ET AL., RAND CORP., THE DEFENDER’S DILEMMA 99–107 (2015) 
(recommending that organizations and public policy take a risk management approach that prioritizes 
the most likely vectors and increases the difficulty level for cybercriminals just enough to make them 
go elsewhere); STEPHEN B. LIPNER & BUTLER W. LAMPSON, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., 
RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE CYBERSECURITY OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 1–2 (2016) (explaining 
how the impossibility of perfect cybersecurity necessitates a risk management based approach that 
prioritizes cost-effective measures and harm reduction). 
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the point where the company might realistically defeat litigation or mitigate the 
costs of potential liability, litigation, and public relations expenditures.178 
B. Public Policy of Regulating Technology: Which Mountain Do We Move? 
Regulating the connected world has long been a contentious topic with 
many arguing the normative and positive reasons for why, how, and whether or 
not to do so.179 This interconnectivity has created novel challenges to the ap-
plication of previously effective common law remedies and has led to land-
mark cases and legislation that have been highly influential on innovation.180 
The 1984 Supreme Court ruling in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc. and the 1995 Northern District Court of California ruling in Reli-
gious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc. are 
often referenced as shaping the development of technology by clarifying the 
obligation of service providers in the wake of new technology that threatened 
to disrupt how courts handled intellectual property rights.181 Similarly, the 
2001 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling in A&M Records, Inc., v. Napster, 
Inc. and the 2005 Supreme Court ruling in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. 
v. Grokster Ltd., largely eliminated further development of peer-to-peer sharing 
networks by extending liability to the operators of these networks as the facili-
tators of the infringing activity of their users.182 
                                                                                                                           
 178 See Brad Lunn, Strengthened Director Duties of Care for Cybersecurity Oversight: Evolving 
Expectations of Existing Legal Doctrine, 4 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 109, 129–33 (2014) (detailing 
strategies for directors to develop processes that will protect them from potential liability). 
 179 See, e.g., Daniel Gervais, The Regulation of Inchoate Technologies, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 665, 
669–70 (2010) (discussing the effects on innovation of regulating new technologies); David R. John-
son & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1400–
02 (1996) (concluding that the difficulties posed by the connectivity of the internet require that regula-
tion account for special characteristics and avoid overstepping appropriate limits); Tim Wu, Agency 
Threats, 60 DUKE L.J. 1841, 1849–50 (2011) (discussing policy avenues for disruptive technologies). 
 180 See Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175, 176–77, 
182–85 (2014) (describing the difficulties created by disruptive innovations on regulatory schemes 
that fit previous frameworks); Johnson & Post, supra note 179, at 1370–76 (discussing the futility of 
traditional notions of governance due to the lack of borders); Lemley & Reese, supra note 5, at 1346–
49, 1381–86 (detailing the effects on industries of attempts to regulate novel issues posed by technol-
ogy and the development of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) to address deficiencies in 
digital copyright infringement enforcement). 
 181 See Lemley & Reese, supra note 5, at 1346–53, 1386–90 (discussing the effect that Sony and 
the DMCA had on the development of innovation around the new boundaries in copyright infringe-
ment liability). See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); 
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 512 largely adopted the standard of intermediary liability in 
Netcom. See Lemley & Reese, supra note 5, at 1346–53, 1386–90 (describing how the ruling was 
incorporated into the legislative process behind the DMCA). 
 182 See Lemley & Reese, supra note 5, at 1381–90 (discussing the “loss of the p[eer]2p[eer] dis-
semination network” in the wake of Napster and the then-continuing Grokster litigation). See general-
ly Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (holding that induce-
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Solutions that shift liability to the creators of data-integrated products 
must grapple with the poor understanding of the present costs and harms of 
data insecurity as well as the future opportunity costs of reducing data-based 
innovation.183 The impossibilities of perfect security and the market forces sus-
taining our use of personal data result in a similar risk posed to each individual 
data subject from a variety of sources.184 Courts have struggled to draw rea-
sonable lines in this environment due to these dynamics and the uncertainty 
accompanying the harm caused by this mystifying new crime.185 
A strict regime that requires all uses of data to comply with stringent se-
curity practices could substantially increase barriers to entry and stymy inno-
vation.186 A hallmark of the technological revolution is the low barrier to en-
try—sometimes simply a single computer connected to the internet—to partic-
ipate in a worldwide economy and create billion-dollar products sans billion-
dollar operations.187 Increasing this barrier will reduce competition by pricing 
out some of the future Gateses, Musks, and Zuckerbergs to the benefit of the 
                                                                                                                           
ment of infringing activity creates intermediary liability); A&M Records, Inc., v. Napster, Inc., 239 
F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (delineating the standards for contributory and vicarious liability in peer-to-
peer filesharing networks). 
 183 See SCHNEIER, supra note 8, at 126 (discussing the market effects of forcing data collectors to 
internalize the costs of harm from this data); Lemley & Reese, supra note 5, at 1389 n.171 (describing 
how it is difficult to project the costs and benefits of “harmful” technologies due to the inherent specu-
lation required and the distribution of societal benefit such innovation brings); see also GUIDO CALA-
BRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 28–29 (1970) (stating that 
attempts to reduce the severity and frequency of accidents through liability must be balanced against 
the cost of this attempt); Scott J. Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Cybersecurity Standard of 
Care?, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 305, 315–16 (2015) (discussing how Judge Learned Hand’s “risk/utility 
formula” for negligence applies to cybersecurity preparedness and the practical difficulties it would 
pose for courts). 
 184 See SCHNEIER, supra note 19, at 140–43 (describing the identical risk posed from each entity 
that possesses a given set of consumer data); see also infra notes 140–178 (discussing the difficulties 
and market failures that have created an insecure network). Schneier likens the dynamic to a burglar: 
the burglar doesn’t care who they rob and if one house’s locks are strong, they will just go next door 
and rob the neighbor. See SCHNEIER, supra 19, at 142 (explaining that attackers are opportunistic and 
choose targets based on vulnerability). Unfortunately, the harm to the data subjects is the same no 
matter where a given set of data is exfiltrated from. Id. Even if most organizations have strong securi-
ty in place, it only takes one breach for that data to be compromised and made available on the black 
market to many nefarious entities. See id. 
 185 See, e.g., Longenecker-Wells v. BenCard Servs., No. 1:15-CV-00422, 2015 WL 5576753, at 
*16 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2015) aff’d, 658 Fed. App’x 659 (3d Cir. 2016) (describing the difficulty of 
drawing reasonable liability lines in this context due to uncertain and potentially asymmetrical costs 
and harms). 
 186 See Lemley & Reese, supra note 5, at 1386–90 (detailing the unworkability of allowing courts 
or Congress to dictate technological standards to programmers as well as the suppressive effect that 
liability has on innovation); see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Economic and Other Barriers to Electronic 
Commerce, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 563, 563–67, 573–75 (2000) (discussing both economic and 
regulatory barriers to entry and how they affect the cost of entering markets). 
 187 See Perritt, supra note 186, at 563–67 (describing the effect the internet has had on lowering 
the barriers to enter global commerce).  
1256 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:1223 
current juggernauts of industry, creating a regime that only they can afford to 
comply with.188 
The potential benefits that would be foregone by increasing these barriers 
to entry are inherently speculative, but can be informed by current trends in the 
industry that demonstrate how data integration can be a competitive ad-
vantage.189 The rise of “smart” devices illustrates the extent that connectivity 
and data integration now provides a cheap and cost-effective market advantage 
over unconnected devices.190 Many of these devices are poorly secured, as evi-
denced by news reports of hackers infiltrating a wide range of connected de-
vices, including one such instance where the processing power of thousands of 
smart-fridges was commandeered into a “botnet” army assembled to facilitate 
further attacks.191 The cost of securing such products could mean they disap-
pear from the market, forcing policymakers to ask: are Americans better served 
trading in their smart fridges—or ensuring that all future smart fridges are 
made by Google and Apple—in favor of security?192 
The market failures that are incentivizing continued vulnerability suggest 
that government intervention could increase efficiency by accounting for group 
interests that individual actors do not prioritize.193 Some sources draw similari-
                                                                                                                           
 188 See id. at 565–67 (explaining that the lower barriers to entry mainly benefit smaller entities). 
 189 See Lemley & Reese, supra note 5, at 1386–90 (explaining that the potential harms and bene-
fits of technology are unknowable and uses the VCR and radio as examples of disruptive technologies 
that eventually came to greatly benefit the industries that initially attempted to suppress them). 
 190 See SCHNEIER, supra note 8, at 5 (attributing the explosive growth of the Internet of Things 
industry to the perceived competitive edge that connectivity gives over older products). The term 
“smart” device typically refers to products that are in some way internet-connected and data integrat-
ed, a capability that is used in a wide range of products to add control and functionality. See Manuel 
Silverio, What Is a Smart Device?—The Key Concept of the Internet of Things, TOWARDS DATA SCI. 
(Dec. 29, 2019), https://towardsdatascience.com/what-is-a-smart-device-the-key-concept-of-the-internet-
of-things-52da69f6f91b [https://perma.cc/K3R8-S28N] (discussing the core features of smart devices 
and the various uses of these data integrated products). 
 191 See SCHNEIER, supra note 8, at 1 (titling his introductory chapter, “Everything is Becoming a 
Computer”); Swapnil Bhartiya, Your Smart Fridge May Kill You: The Dark Side of IoT, INFOWORLD 
(Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.infoworld.com/article/3176673/internet-of-things/your-smart-fridge-may-
kill-you-the-dark-side-of-iot.html [https://perma.cc/QJ3L-H2ZH] (explaining the rampant security design 
flaws in Internet of Things devices); Is Your Smart Fridge Part of a Criminal Botnet?, PYMNTS (June 
30, 2017), https://www.pymnts.com/news/security-and-risk/2017/watchguard-internet-security-report-
shows-your-fridge-could-be-part-of-a-hackers-botnet/ [https://perma.cc/5X3A-TD9C] (reporting on 
the vulnerabilities that led to the Mirai botnet that allowed the hijacking of smart devices for use in 
cyberattacks). 
 192 See Lemley & Reese, supra note 5, at 1386–90 (explaining how this cost-benefit analysis 
involves many uncertain factors); Perritt, supra note 186, at 573–75 (discussing the effect of compli-
ance with regulatory barriers to entry on innovation). 
 193 See Howard C. Kunreuther & Mark V. Pauly, Behavioral Economics and Insurance: Princi-
ples and Solutions, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW, supra note 
56, at 16–17 (hypothesizing that government intervention is appropriate when anomalous behavior 
causes the under-purchase of protection or harm to others or when individuals have difficulty reducing 
their own risk); Shavell, supra note 16, at 359–64 (examining the determinants of efficient govern-
ment intervention); see also Shavell, supra note 173, at 256–57, 279–81 (explaining how individuals 
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ties between data breach risk and the risk environments that characterize spe-
cial insurance programs, like Workers’ Compensation, the National Flood In-
surance Plan, and health insurance, and make recommendations for a tailored 
program to suit their perceived needs of the industry or consumers.194 In an 
ubiquitous risk environment, such as the ever-present risk of workplace acci-
dents, a centralized response can greatly reduce transaction costs and benefit 
from economies of scale.195 Further, such centralized responses are efficient 
when most victims require similar remedies.196 The no-fault reimbursement 
system created by Workers’ Compensation statutes consolidates and reduces 
transaction costs by implementing a remediation process handled by a central 
authority, eliminating the need to litigate most workplace accidents.197 
Looking abroad for answers yields little at this moment—the GDPR took 
effect in May 2018 and there remains a dearth of enforcement actions under its 
provisions, so its economic impact is not yet fully understood.198 Commenta-
tors at opposite ends of the spectrum have mused that the GDPR will be either 
functionally limited in application due to enforcement issues or will have a 
massive impact on the data economy.199 While regulatory action under the 
                                                                                                                           
often consider private benefits and not social benefits in decision making and how groups do the op-
posite).  
 194 See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 9, at 273–76 (noting similar features in cybersecurity to the 
issues that prompted the National Flood Insurance Program and Workers’ Compensation and suggest-
ing a public subsidy for private insurance); Jeff Kosseff, Positive Cybersecurity Law: Creating a Con-
sistent and Incentive-Based System, 19 CHAP. L. REV. 401, 416–18 (2016) (likening the needs of the 
cybersecurity industry to floodplains risks and proposing subsidized and centralized insurance pro-
gram for organizations to buy into). 
 195 See Fishback & Kantor, supra note 74, at 307, 309 (discussing how transaction costs can be 
reduced through a prescribed centralized remediation process when the needs of individuals are simi-
lar); see also Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, A Quick and Inexpensive System for Resolving 
Peer-to-Peer Copyright Disputes, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 9, 14–15 (2005) (arguing that a 
centralized and clear remedy in the uncertain area of digital copyright infringement would provide a 
more efficient response than litigation of novel and complex issues). 
 196 See Lemley & Reese, supra note 5, at 1350–52 (suggesting a centralized dispute resolution 
system would reduce the cost of enforcement by providing faster remedies than requiring copyright 
owners to sue infringers or facilitators of infringement). 
 197 See Fishback & Kantor, supra note 74, at 306–10 (explaining the appeal of the Workers’ 
Compensation system to both employers and employees and the benefits of the reduction in transac-
tion costs and the cost certainty created). 
 198 See DLA PIPER, supra note 133, at 3 (reporting the findings of an earlier survey and finding 
over fifty-nine thousand reported breaches between May 2018 and May 2019). There have been high-
profile enforcement actions of other GDPR privacy provisions in recent months, but the survey found 
only relatively small fines assessed for data breach incidents. See id. 
 199 See, e.g., Tal Zarsky, Incompatible: The GDPR in the Age of Big Data, 47 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 995, 1018–19 (2017) (forecasting possible outcomes and potential issues with enforcement); 
Jeremy Kahn et al., It’ll Cost Billions for Companies to Comply with Europe’s New Data Law, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-22/it-ll-cost-billions-
for-companies-to-comply-with-europe-s-new-data-law [https://perma.cc/R9ZZ-KE54] (reporting 
industry opinions on GDPR obligations and forecasting almost $8 billion in compliance costs for large 
corporations alone); Yves Le Roux, Could GDPR Shrink Big Data?, INFOSECURITY MAG. (Aug. 10, 
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GDPR mostly consisted of minor fines in 2018, a number of more significant 
fines were levied in 2019, such as the £183 million fine imposed on British 
Airways following an attack that exposed the information of 500,000 users.200 
III. GIMME SHELTER: SECURITY AND SMART-FRIDGES 
The technology revolution and the accompanying impossibility of cyber-
security have created an economy that carries poorly understood risks.201 The 
lack of comprehensive data regulation in the United States has funneled the 
process of delineating the duties, obligations, and standards to the courts and 
regulatory bodies.202 The emergent theme to the largely reactive private and 
public enforcement of data breaches has been a judicial search for limiting 
principles that do not cause earthquakes in the status quo.203 This has resulted 
in a system that painfully draws out litigation, creates excess costs, and leaves 
few stakeholders satisfied—while also completely failing to effectively protect 
data.204 Imposing new data security requirements could have a huge impact on 
our economy, but will require a great deal of thought, care, and time to proper-
                                                                                                                           
2017), https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/opinions/could-gdpr-shrink-big-data/ [https://perma.
cc/7G4K-23S8] (discussing the cost of compliance and the implications on the data industry). 
 200 See DLA PIPER, supra note 133, at 3 (examining some of the early and largely minor en-
forcement actions under the GDPR breach notification rules); British Airways Faces Record £183m 
Fine for Data Breach, BBC (July 8, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-48905907 [https://
perma.cc/W32X-E9NQ] (detailing the record breaking fine against the airliner following a malicious 
attack that rerouted users to a fraudulent site that collected their information); Major GDPR Fine 
Tracker, supra note 133 (reporting on major GDPR fines since the regulation has taken effect). 
 201 See N.Y. CYBER TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 4, 8–9 (discussing the reasons behind systemic 
cyber insecurity); SCHNEIER, supra note 19, at 141 (listing various factors that contribute to the de-
fender’s disadvantage in cybersecurity). 
 202 See Boyne, supra note 3, at 299–304, 332–33 (discussing and listing the various industry-
specific regulations that apply to data breaches). 
 203 See, e.g., Longenecker-Wells v. Benecard Servs., No. 1:15-CV-00422, 2015 WL 5576753, at 
*16 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2015) aff’d, 658 Fed. App’x 659 (3d Cir. 2016) (describing the difficulty of 
drawing reasonable liability lines in this context). 
 204 See In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding that increased risk of 
identity theft suffices for Article III standing some six years after the cases were filed and consolidat-
ed); Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, supra 
note 2, at 2–6 (chronicling the consolidated litigation comprising over one hundred filed suits and 
several hundred claims arising out of the laws of all fifty states and the ensuing settlement negotia-
tions); THE AFTERMATH 2018, supra note 33, at 5 (reporting satisfaction levels below 50% for con-
sumer dealings with credit issuers and financial services, credit reporting agencies, law enforcement, 
and the Federal Trade Commission). 
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ly implement.205 Both data subjects and organizations, however, suffer in the 
interim due to the lack of clear standards.206 
This Part reexamines current issues with data breach litigation and looks 
ahead to future issues that may further complicate it and proposes a narrow 
solution, albeit requiring comprehensive federal legislation.207 Section A ana-
lyzes the reasons why the courts and the system of private liability are ill-
suited to the data breach context.208 Section B argues that a legislatively creat-
ed consumer remedy for compromised data subjects would reduce costs by 
eliminating the need for wasteful and complicated consumer data breach class 
action lawsuits.209 Section B also argues that a safe-harbor based compliance 
scheme that facilitates cost-effective cybersecurity strategies would more ef-
fectively incentivize organizations to take action by providing greater cost cer-
tainty without discouraging innovation.210 
A. The Courts Are Ill-Equipped to Handle Consumer  
Data Breach Litigation 
It is unlikely the courts can provide an efficient remedy for consumers 
given the existing roadblocks.211 Litigating this issue is made difficult by the 
dynamics of data security and data risk that often yield a large number of data 
breach victims spread across the country.212 Litigation is expensive even where 
the law is settled, but the lack of precedent in this area makes these cases ex-
tremely complicated.213 The lack of consensus on what constitutes reasonable 
                                                                                                                           
 205 See Cortez, supra note 180, at 176–77, 182–85 (describing the difficulties created by disrup-
tive innovations on regulatory schemes that fit previous frameworks); Johnson & Post, supra note 
179, at 1370–76 (discussing the futility of traditional notions of governance due to the lack of bor-
ders); Lemley & Reese, supra note 5, at 1346–49, 1381–86 (detailing the effects on industries of at-
tempts to regulate novel issues posed by technology). 
 206 See THE AFTERMATH 2018, supra note 33, at 5 (reporting on the considerable consumer dis-
satisfaction with standard identity theft reimbursement and resolution processes); PONEMON INST., 
supra note 10, at 30 (showing that American organizations face an average cost of $7.91 million fol-
lowing a data breach); Fishback & Kantor, supra note 74, at 316 (discussing how unclear legal stand-
ards prior to the adoption of Workers’ Compensation statutes encouraged more creativity in litigation 
to test the limits of the precedent, resulting in an increase in lawsuits). 
 207 See infra notes 211–272 and accompanying text. 
 208 See infra notes 211–238 and accompanying text. 
 209 See infra notes 247–253 and accompanying text. 
 210 See infra notes 254–272 and accompanying text. 
 211 See Shavell, supra note 16, at 366–69 (describing several factors that make private liability a 
preferable enforcement mechanism over government regulation). 
 212 See id. at 366–68 (stating that liability is preferable when the risks are easily accounted for, 
effective precautions exist, and the harms are readily apparent and not dispersed among many victims 
when they occur). 
 213 See id. at 368–69 (stating that liability is more efficient when some administrative costs can be 
avoided by clear legal standards because unnecessary lawsuits will be discouraged when entities are 
clearly in compliance). 
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security further complicates the development of a litigable standard.214 New 
difficulties litigating data breaches may also emerge in the future considering 
how prevalent this problem is likely to continue to be.215 
The multijurisdictional nature of many of these suits introduce novel con-
cepts of law under multiple states’ laws simultaneously.216 Part of the problem 
is that consumers have no way to seek a remedy by themselves, so they must 
amass a class as large as possible to increase bargaining power.217 The battle 
over Article III standing and whether to include those who have not yet suf-
fered harm is paramount to plaintiffs as well as exceptionally difficult for the 
courts to handle.218 The equally unsatisfying alternatives either allow too many 
plaintiffs into the class and overinflate the projection of harm—and size of the 
eventual settlement—or require compromised plaintiffs to suffer concrete harm 
first before seeking redress.219 The uncertainty around what must be shown at 
this stage, as well as the potential stakes, often leads to a vigorous challenge 
from both sides and sometimes multiple interlocutory appeals.220 
                                                                                                                           
 214 See, e.g., LabMD, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 894 F.3d 1221, 1236–37 (11th Cir. 2018) (dis-
cussing the difficulties of litigating reasonable security because of disagreement between experts in 
the field as to what combination of security measures suffices). 
 215 See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688, 696–97 (7th Cir. 2015) (examining issues 
of tracing causation when multiple breaches happen close in time); Kosseff, supra note 194, at 414 
(suggesting that the relative speeds of technological advancement and the legislative process will 
cause some legislative remedies to quickly become obsolete). 
 216 See, e.g., In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1172–76 
(D. Minn. 2014) (assessing various issues in an action consolidated from thirty-three actions originally 
filed in eighteen federal districts). 
 217 See Shavell, supra note 173, at 279–80 (discussing how centralized enforcement is preferable 
in the context of distributed harms by pollution where individuals may lack the incentive to bring suits 
as individual harms are relatively small). Considering the likely remedy of a settlement could amount 
to as low as a couple hundred dollars’ worth of credit monitoring services and reimbursement of prov-
able losses, it is unlikely to be worth the cost of litigation for any single plaintiff. See id. (discussing 
how high transaction costs may prevent individuals from pursuing legal action when their own indi-
vidual harm is fairly low). In general, this is the enforcement mechanism that class action lawsuits are 
supposed to fill, but class certification is not easy in this context due to the issues regarding standing 
and whether putative future victims will be included in the class. See Black, supra note 75, at 200–06 
(detailing several class action certification difficulties that data breach litigants face); see also supra 
notes 75–93 and accompanying text (discussing the battle for standing in data breach litigation). 
 218 See, e.g., In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2018) (finding that Article III 
standing was met when there was an increased risk of identity theft after the cases had been filed and 
consolidated about six years later); Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (find-
ing that increased future risk of identity theft was sufficient for standing); Beck v. McDonald, 848 
F.3d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 2017) (finding increased risk of future identity theft insufficient for standing). 
 219 See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693 (opining that plaintiffs should not have to wait to suffer injury in 
order to satisfy standing or class certification because it was objectively reasonable that such injury 
would occur). 
 220 See, e.g., In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 892 F.3d 968, 979 (8th Cir. 
2018) (affirming grant of motion to certify class that was appealed by members of the class who ob-
jected to a proposed settlement); In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 847 F.3d 608, 
615–16 (8th Cir. 2017) (reversing and remanding for reconsideration of class certification). 
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Developing a standard to evaluate whether reasonable cybersecurity was 
implemented in a given case would be complicated by the variability of securi-
ty practices and budgets of all data-enhanced companies across all indus-
tries.221 Reasonable security as a legal standard would encompass a massive 
grey area and be largely unprovable shy of clearly superlative security or obvi-
ous gross negligence.222 Given the disagreement between cybersecurity ex-
perts, a jury would face significant difficulty accurately determining whether 
reasonable security was provided.223 
A reasonable security standard would also fail to achieve perfect protec-
tion, and in many cases, reasonable security for a given organization would 
still result in a highly vulnerable state.224 Some companies may be able to in-
vest heavily in security, but others may be more hard-pressed to do so, and 
thus hackers could opportunistically choose targets based on vulnerability.225 A 
standard that avoids commandeering the budgets of all data-augmented organi-
zations would guarantee continuing vulnerability and likely provide little pro-
tection for data subjects.226 In cases where a business made reasonable expend-
itures and was breached nonetheless, went bankrupt as a result of a data 
breach, or could not otherwise pay for the harm, the compromised data sub-
jects would be left without a remedy.227 
The lack of consensus as to what constitutes reasonable security prevents 
tort and contract law from adequately serving the needs of data subjects.228 
                                                                                                                           
 221 See LabMD, Inc., 894 F.3d at 1236–37 (musing on the difficulty of proving reasonable securi-
ty standards were met); Brief of the National Technology Security Coalition as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitioner and Vacatur, supra note 73, at 17–19 (advocating that rigid standards ignore the 
practical realities most businesses face, including budget issues, compatibility issues, and the work 
required to implement changes to a complex IT system). 
 222 See LabMD, Inc., 894 F.3d at 1236–37 (discussing the practical limitations to litigating rea-
sonable security due to lack of clear standards and industry consensus); Brief of the National Tech-
nology Security Coalition as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner and Vacatur, supra note 73, at 5–
8 (detailing the complicated cost-benefit analysis that must be undertaken regarding cybersecurity 
investments and how they differ considerably across organizations). 
 223 See, e.g., LabMD, Inc., 894 F.3d at 1236–37 (positing a hypothetical back-and-forth ad infini-
tum between cybersecurity expert witnesses on what constitutes reasonable security). 
 224 See Selznick & LaMacchia, supra note 172, at 244–47 (remarking that reasonable security for 
many small businesses would only account for minimal precautions). 
 225 See SCHNEIER, supra note 19, at 140–43 (explaining how most cybercrime is opportunistic 
and targets are chosen based on who is vulnerable to readily accessible methods); Selznick & LaMac-
chia, supra note 172, at 244–47 (discussing budgetary issues that prevent small businesses from in-
vesting heavily into cybersecurity). 
 226 See SCHNEIER, supra note 19, at 141–50 (detailing the systemic difficulties of cybersecurity); 
Selznick & LaMacchia, supra note 172, at 244–47 (explaining that small businesses often must priori-
tize operations over cybersecurity given a limited budget). 
 227 See Shavell, supra note 16, at 360–63, 67 (discussing instances where private liability is less 
preferable because organizations cannot or are unlikely to pay for the harm caused). 
 228 See id. at 366–68 (explaining that private enforcement of liability is more efficient when pri-
vate parties make rational decisions based on the riskiness of their activities, when private parties are 
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Negligence claims struggle proving duty, breach of that duty, and causation.229 
Established standards of care discourage suits where the standard was clearly 
met, but such standards will be almost impossible to define in the context of 
data breaches.230 Contract clauses guaranteeing reasonable security would also 
be difficult to litigate due to this lack of consensus.231 Moreover, attempts to 
assign fault within the organic network of vulnerabilities that comprise both 
technological and human nature struggle in this environment.232 Consumer 
data would not aggregate to the level where it would be valuable to thieves if 
consumers were not so willing on an individual level to barter with it.233 Thus, 
every member of the data economy bears some level of fault.234 
The difficulties are likely to get worse as breaches continue to occur and 
courts will struggle with the additive effects of continuous and overlapping 
breaches, as well as multiple sources of harm.235 As technology continues to 
become more complex, existing reasonable security standards will quickly be-
                                                                                                                           
able to pay for the harm done, and when litigation is relatively cheap and includes clear legal stand-
ards). 
 229 See LabMD, Inc., 894 F.3d at 1236–37 (pondering the practical difficulties that litigating a 
breach of duty would pose); Remijas, 794 F.3d at 696–97 (discussing the standard of causation that 
must be sufficiently plead for standing purposes); see also E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW, supra 
note 4, § 27.07 (discussing state common law claims and litigation of duties, breaches of that duty, 
causation, and harm). Both of these are largely untested standards beyond the most preliminary stages 
of litigation. See LabMD, Inc., 894 F.3d at 1236–37; Remijas, 794 F.3d at 696–97. 
 230 See Shavell, supra note 16, at 368–70 (explaining that the administrative costs attendant to 
determining compliance bear in favor of public regulation when large amounts of institutional 
knowledge is required to keep these costs low); see also Brief of the National Technology Security 
Coalition as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner and Vacatur, supra note 73, at 13 (detailing the 
challenge CISOs face in keeping up with constantly evolving threats and the considerable resources 
this requires). 
 231 See SCHNEIER, supra note 8, at 133–34 (explaining how consumers have no practical way of 
determining whether companies are representing their security procedures accurately); Strahilevitz & 
Kugler, supra note 168, at 92 (stating that consumers cannot understand most terms of use clauses); 
see also LabMD, Inc., 894 F.3d at 1236–37 (remarking on the difficulties of litigating a cybersecurity 
technical standard); E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW, supra note 4, § 27.10 (discussing contractual 
security provisions and litigation). 
 232 See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 9, at 220–21 (stating that externalities are pervasive in cyber-
security due to cost spreading); Shavell, supra note 145, at 203–04 (explaining how employee deci-
sionmakers do not face the same incentive to prevent harm to the organization because they will not 
experience the majority of this harm). 
 233 See SCHNEIER, supra note 19, at 53–56 (providing examples of how deep collections of data 
spur better personalized advertising through complicated algorithms that in turn increases the value of 
data collection efforts); Shavell, supra note 173, at 256–57 (explaining how individuals discount so-
cial benefits in their own decision making). 
 234 See supra note 233 and accompanying text. 
 235 See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 696–97 (discussing issues of causation when multiple breaches hap-
pen within a short time-frame); Data Breaches, supra note 7 (compiling reported breach figures since 
2005); ITRC Multi-Year Data Breach Chart, supra note 7 (graphing the increase from 157 reported 
breaches in 2005 to over one thousand reported breaches in each of the past three years). 
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come obsolete.236 Causation could become more difficult to prove if the 
breached data could have originated from any number of breach points.237 It 
could get even harder for courts to draw the line between granting costly e-
discovery to bear out such allegations to too many plaintiff classes or too few.238 
B. Embracing Insecurity: Harm Reduction and Cost-Efficiency 
It is beyond the scope of this Note to propose anything more than a basic 
framework for what will inevitably be one of the most complicated pieces of 
legislation in recent history.239 The question of how this activity would be 
funded is also beyond the scope of this Note, but the centralization of both the 
remedy and enforcement mechanism should provide significant cost savings 
overall to both industry and the citizenry.240 
                                                                                                                           
 236 See Brief of the National Technology Security Coalition as Amicus Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioner and Vacatur, supra note 73, at 17–19 (advocating that strict technical standards would be diffi-
cult to keep up with and require constant investment in attempts to comply). The constant evolution of 
technology presents major challenges to cybersecurity as the nature of cyber threats evolves at a simi-
larly rapid pace and requires that chief information security officers “plan and re-plan for an over-
whelming number of contingencies.” Id. at 13. 
 237 See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 696–97 (finding that causation was sufficiently alleged at the plead-
ing stage despite multiple breaches occurring at roughly the same time). The court cited a landmark 
joint liability case involving a plaintiff who was shot by two defendants at the same time. Id. at 696 
(citing Summers v. Tice, 192 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1948)). When two potential sources of the harm exist, the 
burden falls to the defendant to prove that they were not the “but-for” cause of the injury. Id. Now, 
imagine that hundreds of breaches have occurred close in time and targeted similar demographics—
this could create quite a burden on breached organizations trying to prove it was not their breach that 
caused the harm. See id. Courts may even face the challenge of determining whether the repeated 
breach of data begins to dilute its value—if the data has been compromised several times already, how 
much more harmful are subsequent breaches? See SCHNEIER, supra note 8, at 130 (discussing how 
difficult it may be to prove a breach caused harm when the compromised data was already available 
for sale on the black market). 
 238 See Grigsby v. Valve Corp., No. C12-0553JLR, 2012 WL 5993755, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 
14, 2012) (dismissing the complaint and referencing the higher threshold that must be plead over 
standard torts in consideration of the costly e-discovery that would commence); Plaintiffs’ Memoran-
dum in Support of Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, supra note 2, at 1–6 (mentioning 
the discovery process thus far in the streamlined litigation, including over two hundred depositions, 
fourteen discovery motions, and almost four million pages of documents). 
 239 See infra notes 247–272 and accompanying text (proposing the framework of a socially opti-
mal solution). 
 240 See supra notes 1–238 and accompanying text (providing background and discussing and 
analyzing why the attempts to outline a workable private liability standard have failed and created 
excess costs); infra notes 247–272 and accompanying text (discussing why a no-fault approach would 
reduce costs primarily by consolidating transaction and administrative costs); see also Victoria Gra-
ham, Dem Presidential Candidates Seize on Antitrust as Campaign Issue (1), BLOOMBERGLAW (Mar. 
11, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/mergers-and-antitrust/dem-presidential-candidates-seize-on-
antitrust-as-campaign-issue-1 [https://perma.cc/8UTG-RPRH] (discussing Senator Amy Klobuchar’s 
informal proposal to tax tech companies for the use of large consumer datasets). Senator Klobuchar’s 
proposal echoes a similar proposal made by the European Commission to establish a 3% digital ser-
vices tax on large corporations applicable to revenues resulting from the use of consumer data. See 
Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Common System of a Digital Services Tax on 
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The economic principles and technical difficulties surrounding this issue 
indicate that Congress should create a centralized remedy similar to the no-
fault Workers’ Compensation reimbursement scheme in order to reduce the 
costs and harms of data breach.241 A limited approach that both creates a con-
sumer remedy and a regulatory authority to govern all data breach matters 
would improve outcomes for both consumers and organizations.242 The crea-
tion of a National Fund for Identity Theft will provide data subjects with direct 
redress for their harms and reduce transaction costs and administrative fees.243 
The empowerment of a regulatory body and the creation of a safe-harbor based 
incentive scheme will hold organizations more accountable and provide them 
with cost certainty and elimination of catastrophic data breach risk.244 
Most importantly, this proposed solution is narrow enough in scope that it 
can act as a remedy in the near-term for consumers facing identity theft issues 
while the debates on greater issues of cybersecurity, national security, and the 
future of technology continue to coalesce.245 Perhaps providing data subjects 
                                                                                                                           
Revenues Resulting from the Provision of Certain Digital Services, at 24–28, COM (2018) 148 final 
(Mar. 23, 2018) (discussing the European Commission’s tax); Graham, supra (discussing Senator 
Klobuchar’s tax). 
 241 See Fishback & Kantor, supra note 74, at 309 (explaining how Workers’ Compensation stat-
utes were of benefit to both employers and employees because they reduced the cost of settling fre-
quent workplace accident claims); see also supra notes 18–63 and accompanying text (discussing the 
costs of data breach). 
 242 See Steven Shavell, Risk Aversion and the Desirability of Attenuated Legal Change, 16 AM. L. 
& ECON. REV. 366, 393–95 (2014) (discussing how the speed of desirable legal change for each 
stakeholder depends on their cost-benefit analysis of the increased compliance costs and increased 
benefits of the change). The only stakeholders that would stand to lose in this approach is the Data 
Breach Plaintiff’s Bar and the firms retained by the breached organizations, who have reaped consid-
erable benefits from the uncertain legal standards. See id.; e.g., In re Yahoo! Inc. Customer Data Secu-
rity Breach Litig., No. 16-MD-02752-LHK, 2019 WL 387322, at *13–21 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2019) 
(denying the proposed settlement in part because the court concluded that the proposed $35 million set 
aside for attorney’s fees was excessive in light of the relatively minimal litigation work done by the 
class representatives). 
 243 See Fishback & Kantor, supra note 74, at 309 (explaining that the centralized Workers’ Com-
pensation dispute resolution scheme created an efficient claim process by consolidating administrative 
costs and obviating complicated litigation). 
 244 See Kosseff, supra note 194, at 412–14 (discussing a safe-harbor incentive for data security); 
Lemley, supra note 17, at 119 (finding that the safe-harbor enforcement method is an optimal en-
forcement mechanism for internet intermediaries). 
 245 See DANIEL R. COATS, OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, WORLDWIDE THREAT 
ASSESSMENT OF THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 5 (Feb. 13, 2018) (listing cyber threats first 
among global threats and warning of sophisticated acts by state actors as well as lesser criminal acts). 
Security by design has been embraced as a key goal for future development of connected products. 
See, e.g., TIMOTHY E. LEVIN ET AL., SECURECORE, DESIGN PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR SECU-
RITY 1–2 (2007) (discussing the importance of emphasizing security at the design stage of a new 
product). This becomes practically difficult due to the Lemons Market effect resulting from consumer 
tastes and preferences rarely rewarding such investment. SCHNEIER, supra note 8, at 133–35. Such 
solutions, should the Lemons Market roadblock be overcome, are necessarily forward thinking and 
would require an overhaul of the systems and programs we currently rely on. See N.Y. CYBER TASK 
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with a reliable and easy remedy will also reduce the taboo of data breach—
significant reputational harm and damage-control costs could be avoided if the 
inevitability of insecurity and its harms are recognized and accounted for.246 
1. Consumer Remedy 
Establishing a National Fund for Identity Theft will substantially simplify 
the process of seeking redress for identity theft issues.247 Quite similar to how 
Worker’s Compensation funds work, the ubiquitous risk can be more efficient-
ly accounted for by the reduced transaction costs and the economies of scale 
that a centralized response provides.248 This would allow individuals to seek 
reimbursement or credit monitoring when it is actually needed and it is likely 
to provide a more satisfactory resolution process.249 The required disclosures 
and compliance obligations of the safe-harbor program detailed below will 
help create a more efficient response through information sharing and poten-
tially affected individuals can be more quickly alerted and monitored.250 
This remedy removes the need for data subjects to attempt to litigate rea-
sonable security standards, class certification, or standing.251 It eliminates the 
                                                                                                                           
FORCE, supra note 6, at 22–23 (making recommendations for future development of a more defensible 
cyberspace). Minimizing the complexity of computer networks by reducing the number of unique 
programs and software is one such recommendation to shift the balance in favor of defenders by re-
ducing the number of potential vulnerabilities that must be accounted for. Id. 
 246 See DREYER ET AL., supra note 11, at 1 (finding reputational losses account for 8% of the 
costs of data breaches to organizations); PONEMON INST., supra note 10, at 29 (finding that American 
organizations face higher costs due to customer loss and diminished goodwill than other countries); 
see also supra notes 137–178 (discussing the guaranteed insecurity of internet connected devices). 
 247 See, e.g., In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1172–76 
(analyzing the precedents of eleven different states in order to determine which plaintiffs will be in-
cluded in the large federal plaintiff class); Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Ap-
proval of Class Action Settlement, supra note 2, at 1–6 (recounting the history of the litigation, con-
solidated into a single action from over one hundred lawsuits and several hundred claims under all 
fifty state laws and including considerable discovery efforts and over a dozen motions). 
 248 See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 9, at 269–76 (noting similar features in cybersecurity to the 
issues with inefficient transaction costs that prompted the National Flood Insurance Program and 
Workers’ Compensation and suggesting a public subsidy for private insurance). 
 249 See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693 (remarking that the plaintiffs who have not yet suffered harm 
should not have to wait until they do to seek redress); THE AFTERMATH 2018, supra note 33, at 5 
(discussing consumer satisfaction with identity theft resolution processes); THE AFTERMATH 2017, 
supra note 11, at 7–12 (discussing the negative impacts of identity theft). 
 250 See Sasha Romanosky et al., Do Data Breach Disclosure Laws Reduce Identity Theft?, 30 J. 
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 256, 259–60 (2011) (finding a 6.1% reduction in identity theft following 
timely breach notifications in a survey of the beneficial effects that predated the mass adoption of such 
laws). Breach notification helps those affected avoid harm if proactive measures, such as credit freez-
es or credit monitoring, are undertaken to prevent potential identity theft. See id. 
 251 See Fishback & Kantor, supra note 74, at 307, 316 (discussing the benefits to both employers 
and employees of removing the need to litigate workplace accidents, an area governed at the time by 
uncertain legal standards and defenses that prompted excess litigation); see also supra notes 64–133 
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difficulty of granting too many or too few plaintiffs standing and reduces waste 
in the form of settlement funds earmarked for potential future victims who may 
not actually suffer harm.252 It will benefit organizations by reducing the forecast-
ed risk of a breach and removing the considerable costs of data subject litigation, 
allowing them to focus on the other litigation they are likely to face.253 
2. Incentives-Based Regulation of Data Security 
An incentives-based regime that provides a safe-harbor from consumer 
data breach litigation will allow organizations to operate with more cost cer-
tainty and can be leveraged to promote better practices throughout the indus-
try.254 This greater cost certainty and overall clearer compliance standards 
should help foster innovation rather than restrict it.255 Avoiding consumer data 
breach litigation, and thus reducing the costs and risks of a potential data 
breach, will be a far more effective incentive to meet compliance standards.256 
Data breaches would not go entirely unpunished and the regulatory au-
thority could assess fines or other heightened compliance requirements.257 
These fines would be more appropriately tailored to the actual harms of a data 
breach and would be far less expensive than litigating a data breach by elimi-
                                                                                                                           
and accompanying text (providing background information on the various difficulties of consumer 
data breach litigation). 
 252 See, e.g., Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693 (deciding that a potentially larger than necessary class was 
more fair than requiring consumers to actually suffer harm before seeking redress); In re Yahoo! Inc. 
Customer Data Security Breach Litig., 2019 WL 387322, at *22 (denying the proposed settlement 
agreement in part due to the potentially inflated number of class members in comparison to the num-
ber of active Yahoo! users at the time). 
 253 See PONEMON INST., supra note 10, at 28 (reporting the significant costs of litigation to 
breached organizations); supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text (discussing the complex business-
to-business litigation that often follow data breaches). 
 254 See Kosseff, supra note 194, at 412–14 (arguing that incentive-based safe-harbor programs 
achieve greater compliance by offering organizations an optional compliance regime that creates cost 
certainty). 
 255 See Stephen Shavell, Do Excessive Legal Standards Discourage Desirable Activity?, 95 
ECON. LETTERS 394, 395 (2007) (modeling a depressive effect on innovation if the legal standard is 
overly burdensome). This should not be an issue here, as theoretically the costs of a data breach will 
be reduced overall and costs of precautions will be clarified. See id. 
 256 See PONEMON INST., supra note 10, at 28 (reporting on the considerable litigation costs of data 
breaches that American organizations incur); Fishback & Kantor, supra note 74, at 306–10 (detailing the 
appeal of the no-fault system to employers, who saved on the considerable transaction costs of litigating 
workplace accidents); Shavell, supra note 173, at 279–80 (explaining scenarios where organizations are 
unlikely to be motivated to reduce risks if the risky behavior otherwise generates value). 
 257 See Shavell, supra note 16, at 373–74 (comparing the deterrence effect of fines with that of 
private liability); Shavell, supra note 173, at 281 (discussing the effectiveness of fines as an enforce-
ment mechanism in safety regulation when such fines reflect the savings of failing to take required 
precautions). Shavell writes that fines are sometimes less effective than liability if private parties 
know when they have been harmed better than public agencies do, but this would be mitigated to 
some extent by the breach reporting requirements of the safe-harbor. See Shavell, supra note 16, at 
373–74. 
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nating many of the unnecessary transaction costs.258 The tiered safe-harbor 
could offer various levels of protection from these fines in the wake of 
breach.259 The highest compliance levels would be akin to some of the auditing 
and monitoring obligations commonly found in FTC consent decrees and offer 
complete immunity from fines.260 Fines would be steep for entities that do not 
meet the safe-harbor, but increasing levels of compliance activity would yield 
smaller fines and less exposure to risk.261 Fines would be based on the amount 
and the sensitivity of the data lost, which would encourage greater compliance 
from those using the most sensitive data.262 This would also encourage organiza-
tions to assess what data is actually adding value to their operations and to min-
imize unnecessary collection.263 Organizations will be better able to prioritize 
which of their systems they most need to protect, such as those containing trade 
secrets or especially sensitive personal data, with this enhanced risk certainty.264 
The development of institutional knowledge on cybersecurity is crucial to 
the cost-effectiveness of this model as the information collection will allow for 
more efficient investments to be made into security.265 Much of the current 
                                                                                                                           
 258 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Costly Litigation and Optimal Damages, 37 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 86, 86 (2014) (discussing the social costs of complex litigation in addition to the 
cost of the injury being litigated). 
 259 See Lemley, supra note 17, at 110–19 (exploring the merits and demerits of various safe-
harbor frameworks). 
 260 See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Approval of Class Action Set-
tlement, supra note 2, at 7 (listing Anthem’s three-year auditing and reporting obligations to the plain-
tiff class of consumers); E-COMMERCE AND INTERNET LAW, supra note 4, § 27.06 (listing several 
Federal Trade Commission consent decrees related to cybersecurity failings); Resolution Agreement 
between Anthem, Inc. and Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. (Oct. 15, 2018) (obligating Anthem to 
pay $16 million to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights and to 
implement a corrective action plan subject to audit for two years). 
 261 See Kosseff, supra note 194, at 412–14 (arguing that incentive-based safe-harbor programs 
achieve greater compliance by offering organizations an optional compliance regime that creates cost 
certainty). Greater compliance can be undertaken for greater cost certainty, whereas those that choose 
a lower level of compliance forego such certainty. See id. 
 262 See Shavell, supra note 16, at 373–74 (describing the use of fines as a deterrence method in a 
regulatory scheme); Shavell, supra note 173, at 281–82 (discussing the use of fines as an enforcement 
mechanism in safety regulations). 
 263 See Shavell, supra note 16, at 373–74 (discussing the deterrence value of fines); Shavell, su-
pra note 173, at 281–82 (same). 
 264 See Gene Fredriksen, Protecting the Crown Jewels, FORBES (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/08/13/protecting-the-crown-jewels/#42521881a5a9 [https://
perma.cc/Q2GX-F4AW] (emphasizing the importance of prioritizing security investment and training 
to protect against existential data risks); Cybersecurity Breach Bankruptcy: It Does Happen, FRAC-
TIONAL CISO (Jan. 23, 2019), https://fractionalciso.com/cybersecurity-breach-bankruptcy/ [https://
fractionalciso.com/cybersecurity-breach-bankruptcy/] (explaining the relative risks to businesses of 
different cyber incidents and listing instances where theft of intellectual property led to bankruptcies). 
 265 See Shavell, supra note 16, at 369 (discussing how regulatory agencies sometimes have an 
economic advantage over private parties when collection of information requires expensive empirical 
analysis and aggregation of data). See generally DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CYBER INCIDENT DATA 
AND ANALYSIS REPOSITORY WORKSHOP (2016) (outlining the goals of the Cyber Incident Data and 
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investment in cyber security is incurred in an inefficient manner across the 
economy: moderately secure safeguards being deployed at great expense by 
individual organizations while consumers are still vulnerable from many other 
angles.266 Cybersecurity investments are a cost of doing business for responsi-
ble organizations, but they do not appreciably increase overall consumer data 
privacy nor are they likely to prevent costly litigation.267 The regulatory au-
thority would be directed to propagate cheap and effective practices in a man-
ner similar to the Department of Homeland Security’s current Cyber Infor-
mation Sharing and Collaboration Program.268 
Breach reporting will be a necessary compliance obligation of the safe-
harbor which will encourage timely disclosures.269 An effective information 
network can be created and the industry can be alerted to vulnerabilities and 
hotfixes faster.270 Reporting will become centralized and more thorough and 
victims can be more efficiently alerted by the regulatory authority.271 The 
compliance scheme could also help outline a workable standard to simplify 
                                                                                                                           
Analysis Repository (CIDAR), an information collection and dissemination system that seeks to pro-
vide timely warnings of cyber threats and direct organizations to patches and hotfixes). 
 266 See N.Y. CYBER TASK FORCE, supra note 6, at 7 (explaining that annual cybersecurity spend-
ing has surpassed $75 billion, but has done “little more than slow th[e] progressive onslaught,” of 
cyberattacks). If one company invests enough to secure its systems it is likely to escape harm, but 
consumers must rely on a near perfect track record among all of the many entities that hold their data. 
See Schneier, supra note 169 (describing the scope of the data broker industry and how consumers are 
largely unaware of how many entities hold their data and how securely it is being held). One such 
entity failing to do so may compromise data despite all of the money invested by the others. See id. 
 267 See SCHNEIER, supra note 8, at 101 (“[S]ecurity is a tax on the honest.”); Hermalin, supra note 
139, at 321 (explaining that the welfare loss is borne by providers of high-quality products in a lemons 
market when buyers are quality-indifferent). 
 268 See Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration Program (CISCP), DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/cisa/cyber-information-sharing-and-collaboration-program-ciscp [https://
perma.cc/CN5V-SFKM] (detailing the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) information shar-
ing program, a public-private partnership that helps facilitate information sharing and threat adviso-
ries). The Cyber Information Sharing and Collaboration Program is free to join and provides free 
consulting and security products. Id. 
 269 See Kosseff, supra note 194, at 412–14 (discussing the effectiveness of safe-harbors as a com-
pliance incentive given the costs and uncertainties associated with litigation). 
 270 See National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/cisa/national-cybersecurity-communications-integration-center [https://
perma.cc/2UK2-XE9A] (detailing the DHS information sharing program, the National Cybersecurity 
& Communications Integration Center (NCCIC)); see also DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 265 
(emphasizing the importance of data collection through the creation of the CIDAR database of infor-
mation surrounding cyber incidents). NCCIC, CIDAR, and other information sharing programs seek 
to collect and distribute information and provide alert systems that will help security professionals 
react to new threats faster and reduce the harm caused by each threat. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
supra note 265; National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, supra. 
 271 See Breach Notification Laws, supra note 56 (listing the state breach notification laws for all 
fifty states). Breach notification has clearly been identified as an important feature of any data security 
law. See id.; see also Romanosky et al., supra note 250, at 259–60 (discussing how timely breach 
notification allows potential victims to take protective measures prior to experiencing harm). 
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some of the litigation that it does not obviate, like contract and indemnification 
claims between businesses.272 
CONCLUSION 
Consumer data breach litigation encounters numerous roadblocks that 
hinder efficient resolutions and often requires years of litigation before con-
sumers receive a remedy for their harms. The unique risk environment created 
by the risk uncertainty, market failures preventing consumers and organiza-
tions from properly valuing security, and the inherent vulnerability of technol-
ogy create considerable excess costs in this litigation. The extension of liability 
in this area could have far-reaching effects on the development of many data 
integrated technologies and industries. Significant costs can be saved by ceas-
ing attempts to slowly outline private liability and creating a centralized reme-
dy and enforcement mechanism that acknowledges the inevitability of data 
breaches and takes advantage of economies of scale. This approach will sub-
stantially improve outcomes for both compromised data subjects as well as 
breached organizations. Additionally, the safe-harbor incentive can be lever-
aged to improve cybersecurity practices without overburdening data-based in-
novation. 
MAX MEGLIO 
                                                                                                                           
 272 See Shavell, supra note 16, at 369 (describing how regulatory agencies can have an advantage 
over private parties due to economies of scale when collection of information requires expensive em-
pirical analysis and aggregation of data). See generally National Cybersecurity and Communications 
Integration Center, supra note 270 (outlining the goals of the NCCIC information collection and shar-
ing system). 
